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REFORMING SOFTWARE PATENTS1 
Colleen Chien2 
 
Abstract 
 
While many believe the patent system has hit a historic and unprecedented low, 
discontent with patents is nothing new. In 1966, a Presidential Commission recommended 
prohibiting software patents because of the PTO’s inability to vet them. In 1883, the Supreme 
Court railed against “speculative schemers who make it their business to watch the advancing 
wave of improvement and gather its foam in the form of patented monopolies, which enable 
them to lay a heavy tax.” In 1836, the Ruggles Report documented how lax patent standards, 
“encourag[ed] fraudulent speculators in patent rights, deluging the entire country with worthless 
monopolies, and laying the foundation for endless litigation.” In short, the problems that now 
confront the patent system are well-known. What is less well-known, however, is that many of 
the very reforms being considered - abolishing certain types of patents, fee-shifting, and an 
increasing maintenance fees for example - have been called for and in many cases tried before, 
under similar and different conditions. In fact, agrarian design patents were “abolished,” 
according to a recent historical account, but by tweaking the standard for granting a design 
patent, rather than by outlawing patents relevant to a specific industry. Fee-shifting has been the 
norm in many European countries and in certain US contexts – and the theory and evidence 
indicate that it works best when low-odds cases can be identified ahead of time and the loser is 
not judgment proof – predicates that, given the unpredictability of patent litigation and the use of 
shell companies to bring patent litigation, cannot always be satisfied. During this historic 
moment, what can the past teach the present and the future about how to solve the software 
patent crisis? Based on my research, quite a lot. History teaches away from broad based 
legislative reform and towards, narrowly tailored, incremental reform. For example rather than 
trying to enact an independent invention defense, patent reformers could consider bolstering 
protection for users, which are in some situations protected in other countries and in the US in 
the case of medical method patents, by encouraging courts to stay cases brought against them 
rather than the manufacturer. Rather than pushing for new changes to the law, patent targets 
could pool information and prior art and capture economies of scale in taking advantage of the 
multiple ways a patent can be challenged after issuance. These and other suggestions and 
available historical and empirical evidence about what has been tried, what has worked, and what 
has not, are detailed in this paper. 
                                                 
1 © 2012 Colleen V. Chien, colleenchien@gmail.com. Final draft to be published in 2012 Houston Law Review. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The patent system is in crisis. Though supposed to “promote the progress of [] the useful 
arts,”3 the patent system is routinely now blamed for doing the opposite.  The increasingly 
widespread, legal practice of buying or developing patents and using them for assertion and 
licensing,4 rather than for making products5 (“patent trolling”) is typically blamed.  
These developments have led the mainstream press and lawmakers to compare patent 
enforcement to “shakedown” efforts by organized criminals.6 Patent trolling is now being seen as 
a business model to be outlawed, or at least regulated.7 Proposals to abolish software patents 
have become mainstream,8 and patent holders have been excoriated in the halls of Congress for 
suing technology users like the Red Cross for soliciting charitable contributions on the Internet9 
and going after companies like Costco and McDonald’s.10 Patent wars between competitors have 
raised a host of other issues. In 2012, Google spent $12.5B to buy Motorola Mobility and its 
patents,11 and $5.2B in 2011 on R&D.12 In 2011, Apple spent $2.4B on R&D13 but contributed 
                                                 
3 See U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 8. 
4 For example, Colleen Chien, NPEs and the ND California, Address at the Northern District of California Judicial 
Conference 9 (April 26, 2012), (reporting data provided by RPX Corp. that indicates that 55% of new suits from 
January 1, 2012 to April 8, 2012 have been brought by companies that do not practice their patents – non-practicing 
entities (“NPEs”)).  
5 Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for the 
Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 328 (2010) (PAEs are “entities . . . focused on the enforcement, rather than 
the active development or commercialization of their patents.”), accord, FTC The Evolving IP Marketplace: 
Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with Competition 8 n.5 (Mar. 2011), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf.  Unlike the more popular term “NPE,” “PAE” excludes 
startups and others who seek to commercialize their technology. 
6 See, e.g., Ryan Davis, Cisco, Others Tell Lawmakers to Keep NPEs Out of ITC, Law360 (July 18, 2012), 
http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/360428?nl_pk=bbc3d26f-4bfd-4165-97b0-
226125cbf024&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ip (quoting Rep. Zoe Lofgren as 
referring to patent enforcement as a “shakedown situation.”), see also remarks of Chris Sacca in This American Life, 
Episode 441: When Patents Attack! transcript available at http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-
archives/episode/441/transcript.  
7 Introductory remarks of Representative Goodlatte, Hearing on the ITC and Patent Disputes before the House of 
Representatives Judiciary Committee on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet Subcommittee. July 18, 
2012 <add link to transcript when available> <add parenthetical re: same>. 
8 See, e.g., Oversight of the United States Patent and Trademark Office: Implementation of the Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act and International Harmonization Efforts, Comments of Sen. Dianne Feinstein, June 20, 2012 
<add link, parenthetical to same>. 
9 157 CONG. REC. H4480, H4496 (Statement of Rep. Crowley) (legislative history in the House of the America 
Invents Act), available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/20110623-debate_hr_1249_h4480-h4505.pdf.  
(hereinafter referred to as “House AIA History.”) Ziarno v. Am. Red Cross, No. 99 C 3430 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 2001). 
10 House AIA History, supra note ___ at H4496 (statement of Rep. Grimm). See, e.g., Kelora Systems, LLC v. 
Target Corporation et al., (N.D. Cal., Aug. 29, 2011, C 11-02284 CW LB) 2011 WL 6000759 (Costco); GeoTag 
Inc v. Starbucks Corp et al., No. 2:10-cv-00572-TJW (McDonald’s). 
11 Google Official Blog, We’ve acquired Motorola Mobility, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2012/05/weve-
acquired-motorola-mobility.html (last visited May 24, 2012); Jenna Wortham, Google Closes $12.5 Billion Deal to 
Buy Motorola Mobility, New York Times (May 22, 2012), available at 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/google-closes-12-5-billion-deal-to-buy-motorola-mobility. Google has 
since said that of the $12.5B, $5.5were for patents, see Phil Goldstein, Google: Motorola’s Patents Worth $5.5B, 
Fierce Wireless (July 25, 2012), available at http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/google-motorolas-patents-worth-
55b/2012-07-25. 
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more, approximately $2.6B, to a single transaction to buy patents from Nortel.14  
The patent system, it seems, has hit a historic low, at least in the public eye. 
Yet discontent with patents is nothing new. In 2006, Justices of the Supreme Court 
criticized the use of patents “to charge exorbitant fees” of productive companies.15 In 1994, at 
hearings held by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), software patents were described by a 
startup executive as “defensive and an infuriating waste of our technical talent and financial 
resources.”16  Most programmers that testified about software patents testified against them.17 In 
1967, a Presidential Commission opposed granting software patents because of the PTO’s 
inability to vet them.18 
Fears that patents are hurting, rather than helping, innovation go back further. In 1883, 
the Supreme Court railed against “speculative schemers who make it their business to watch the 
advancing wave of improvement and [] lay a heavy tax.”19 Five years before that, Senator 
Christiancy complained to Congress about “patent-sharks [who][] procure an assignment of [a][] 
useless patent, and at once proceed to levy black-mail [] upon any man who has ever 
manufactured or sold, or even used, the later and valuable invention; and hundred[s], at least, 
among the innocent users, choose to compromise rather than run the risk of ruin from lawsuits; [] 
millions are thus filched and extorted from the people every year.”20 In 1836, the Ruggles Report 
                                                                                                                                                             
12 Google, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), (Jan 26, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312512025336/d260164d10k.htm (reporting an R&D 
expenditure of $5.2B in 2011). [update with 2012 data if available pre-publication] 
13 Apple, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), (Oct. 26, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/320193/000119312511282113/d220209d10k.htm (reporting an R&D 
expenditure of $2.4B in fiscal year 2011 (ending September 30, 2011)). 
14 Apple, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), (July 20, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/320193/000119312511192493/d10q.htm (“On June 27, 2011, the 
Company, as part of a consortium, participated in the acquisition of Nortel’s patent portfolio for an overall purchase 
price of $4.5 billion, of which the Company’s contribution will be approximately $2.6 billion.”).  
15 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396, 126 S.Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006) (Kennedy concurrence 
(joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer)). 
16 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PUBLIC HEARING ON USE OF THE PATENT SYSTEM TO PROTECT 
SOFTWARE-RELATED INVENTIONS AT SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA -- JANUARY 26-27, 1994, 48 (1994), available at: 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/hearings/software/sanjose/sjhrng.pdf [hereinafter SAN JOSE HEARING].  
17 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PUBLIC HEARING ON USE OF THE PATENT SYSTEM TO PROTECT 
SOFTWARE-RELATED INVENTIONS AT ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA -- FEBRUARY 10-11, 1994 (1994), available at: 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/hearings/software/arlington/vahrng.pdf [hereinafter VIRGINIA HEARING] [the 
SAN JOSE HEARING and the VIRGINIA HEARING will be referred to collectively as SOFTWARE PATENT HEARINGS], at 
90-91. Commissioner Bruce Lehmann stated: “There is no question about it that the lawyers seem to very much in 
favor of patent protection. Companies tend to be somewhat split, and programmers who've testified, though not all, a 
majority of them have testified against it.” Accord, independent analysis “SW Patent Hearings Sorted.xls” (finding 
that only 2 out of 13 software engineers testified in favor of software patents). 
18  THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, “TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF . . . USEFUL ARTS, at 
21, Report to the Senate Judiciary Committee, S. Doc. No. 5, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (GPO 1967). (“The Patent Office 
now cannot examine applications for programs because of the lack of a classification technique and the requisite 
search files.  Even if these were available, reliable searches would not be feasible or economic because of the 
tremendous amount of prior art being generated.  Without this search, the patenting of programs would be 
tantamount to mere registration.”).   
19 Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200, 2 S.Ct. 225, 231 (1883). 
20 8 CONG. REC. 307-308 (1878) (Statement of Sen. Christancy). 
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documented how lax patent standards, “encourag[ed] fraudulent speculators in patent rights, 
deluging the entire country with worthless monopolies, and laying the foundation for endless 
litigation.”21 American patent nuisance lawsuits date back to the early 1790s.22 In 1601, British 
parliamentarians complained excessively about “royal monopolies”23 in the House of 
Commons.24 
Thus, many of the problems, real or perceived, that currently confront the patent system 
are familiar and well-known. In both modern and historical times, large numbers of colorably 
infringed patents, oftentimes held by entities that do not make products, have been asserted 
against users and makers of technology. Less well-known, however, is that many of the very 
reforms which are now being proposed have been called for and in many cases tried before, in 
response to both similar and different conditions.   
For example, those dissatisfied with the current patent system have recently demanded 
shifting costs to losing plaintiffs,25 creating an independent invention defense,26 and the end of 
software patents.27 Not for the first time. Beginning in the 1880s, farmer groups lobbied for the 
creation of an innocent user defense, fee-shifting provisions that would deter frivolous claims, 
and eliminating certain patents, all in response to demands made by patent-holders of agrarian 
patents.28  
Patent reformers also now press for reducing damages29 and increasing the fees patent 
owners must pay to keep their patents active,30 effectively reducing their term.31 Just like in the 
late 1800s, when railroad companies sued en masse by patent purchasers in the pushed to change 
how damages were calculated and impose renewal fees on granted patents.32   
Recent and related history and experiences are also instructive. In the past decade, 
Congress and the PTO have extensively regulated business method patents.33The courts and 
Congress have changed nearly every aspect of patent law – its remedies, procedure, and 
substance.34 Nuisance lawsuits date back to Justinian times,35 and in the US, efforts to curb 
                                                 
21 Senate Report Accompanying Senate Bill No. 239, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. (April 28, 1836). 
22 Described in Robert P. Merges, The Trouble With Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, And Patent Law Reform, 24 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1592 (2009). Many of the problems were related to the registration - rather than 
examination - based system in place at the time.  
23 As patents were called then. 
24 Thomas B. Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism, and Intellectual Property 91 Va. L. Rev. 1313 (2005) at *20-21. 
25 E.g. through the introduction of the 2012 SHIELD Act, described infra, at Section ___. 
26 Described infra, at Section ___. 
27 Described infra, at Section ___. 
28 Described infra, at Section ___. 
29 See, e.g., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND 
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION Chapter 4 (2011) (describing and advocating for the continued evolution of damages 
law in order for the judicial remedy “to replicate the market reward”). 
30 See, e.g., proposals from Gerard Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of 
Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1813, 1836-37 (2007) (describing increased maintenance fees as a 
“dormancy tax”) and others, infra at Section ___. 
31 See, e.g. www.defendinnovation.org (advocating that software patents be limited to a five-year term).  
32 Described infra, at Section __. 
33 Described infra, at Section __. 
34 Described infra, at Section ___. 
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perceived litigation abuses, primarily in tort law, have been ongoing for decades.36 
Some of these efforts have worked, others have failed. But virtually every idea currently 
proposed has been tried before, in some version. Collectively, these historic and more recent 
efforts, and how they have fared, represent a rich data source of experiments to fix the patent 
system. Studying them provides a context for understanding the current situation, why certain 
proposals have failed, and which ones are likely to succeed. Upon reflection, they reveal the 
different roles institutions have played, in both initiating and implementing reform and a host of 
other lessons. 
During this historic moment, what can be learned about the nature of the current 
technology patent crisis and how to resolve it? Based on the research described below regarding 
what has been tried, what has worked, and what hasn’t, I believe, quite a lot.  Pausing to reflect 
can help policymakers avoid the mistakes the past, illuminate the paths they should be exploring, 
and be mindful of current progress. The benefit of hindsight is substantial where, as here, there 
are strong parallels between the past and present. 
The Federal Circuit’s State Street decision confirming the patentability of business 
method patents was decided in 1998. From 2005 to 2012, Congress debated and finally passed a 
new patent law,37  and the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit changed many aspects of patent 
law. 38 Patent reform in both venues continues.39 
According to a recent account, the agrarian patent crisis started when functional design 
patents were created by the PTO and Congress around 1869.40 It took about 30 years for this 
patent crisis to develop and resolve, through a combination of PTO and legislative acts.41 There 
was a significant push for railroad patent reform around the same time. About twelve years 
elapsed between two seminal patent cases42 that set and changed the balance of power involving 
                                                                                                                                                             
35 See Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience With Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37 
(1984) (describing the origins of fee-shifting rules in Europe and frivolous litigation in the Justinian era, around 400 
A.D.).  See also Robert P. Merges, The Trouble With Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, And Patent Law Reform, 24 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1592 (2009). According to Robert Merges, nuisance patent lawsuits in the U.S. date 
back to the late 1790s, when patents were in effect registered rather than examined.  
36 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller, The English vs. The American Rule on Attorneys Fees: An 
Empirical Study of Attorney Fee Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts (November 9, 2010), NYU Law 
and Economics Research Paper No. 10-52, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1706054. See also Ronen 
Avraham, and John Golden, From PI to IP: Yet Another Unexpected Effect of Tort Reform (July 12, 2012). U of 
Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 211. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1878966 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1878966 (discussing the parallels between tort reform and patent reform and the 
dynamic of same.) 
37 Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II, 21 Fed. Cir. B.J. 435 
(2012), (Part I), at 438 available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2064740. 
38 Described infra, at Section __. 
39 Described infra, at Section ___. 
40 Described in Magliocca , Barnyards, supra note __ at 1820-21, and infra, Section___. 
41 Id. 
42 Sayles v. Chicago and NW Ry Co., 21 F. Cas. 600 (1871), aff’d by Railway Company v. Sayles, 99 U.S. 554, 556–
57 (1878) (affirming a pro-patentee doctrine for deciding damages, the doctrine of savings), and Atlantic Works v. 
Brady, 107 U.S. 192 (1883), 199–200 (in dicta, condemning “speculative schemers” who used “patented 
monopolies[] to lay a heavy tax upon the industry of the country without contributing anything to the real 
advancement of the art.”). 
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disputes between railroads and the patent holders that demanded royalties from them. 
To be sure, historical and modern eras differ. In the late 1800s, the Patent Office played a 
substantive policy-making role,43 the International Trade Commission (ITC) was not a major 
patent venue,44 and competitors tended not to engage in sustained patent wars. There was no 
Federal Circuit.45 
But the similarities are striking. Each patent crisis evolved in part in response to a surge 
in patenting46 driven by rapid economic growth in at least part of the economy. Each generated 
many thoughtful, substantive proposals to change substantive law that were never enacted. They 
all generated great anxiety for specific sectors of the economy; the agrarian and railroad crises 
were resolved through changes to the patent system that largely left other sectors of the economy 
intact. Much progress was achieved outside the halls of Congress, and in the courts, the PTO, 
and through self-help. Applying a lens that is informed by these historical lessons provides a 
different and constructive view of modern-day reforms. It casts skepticism on broad-based 
reforms that are popular but hard to tailor narrowly. It highlights both the need for judicial and 
legislative reform and the importance of self-help, including capturing economies of scale, 
coordinating strategies and sharing information, and resisting the divide and conquer strategies 
of patent speculators, to advance the interests of consumers and companies.  
Section I describes three features commonly associated with the current and past patent 
crises: (1) too many trivial patents, held by (2) specialized and invulnerable patent plaintiffs (3) 
that bring cases for their nuisance value. Section II summarizes the development and resolution 
of the agrarian and railroad patent crises. Section III discusses several groups of current 
proposals, including: (1) reducing the number of software patents by abolishing them, (2) 
bolstering patent defenses through an independent invention defense, and (3) changing the 
economics of patent litigation, including through fee-shifting, as well as (4) self-help attempts; 
their historical counterparts, and what past experiences can teach. 
Section I: What’s the Problem?  
The use of patents to extract settlements or exclude competitors is perfectly legal and 
nothing new. So is the opportunistic use of patents to accomplish the same aims. Indeed, Robert 
Merges cites as historical examples of patent rent-seeking: nuisance suits based on patents after 
the 1793 patent act, agricultural patents in the 1860s and 1870s,47 railroad patents of around the 
same time, and automobile patents in the early 1900s.48 The rent-seeking comes in the pattern of 
                                                 
43 One example of the PTO’s authority is described in Gerard N. Magliocca, Ornamental Design and Incremental 
Innovation, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 845, 850-851 (2003) (recounting successful efforts by the Patent Commissioner to 
lobby Congress regarding design patents, with the result that Congress “just deferred.”) the. 
44 Not until the ITC was modernized under the 1974 Trade Act did it become so. Described in Chien, Patently 
Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & Mary L. 
Rev. 63 (2008). 
45 The Federal Circuit was created under the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, which merged the United 
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the appellate division of the United States Court of Claims. 
46 Described infra, at note ___. [reference the patent numbers and description re: name] 
47 Gerard Magliocca’s paper, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1809 (2007) provides an excellent recent description, drawing upon historical and primary accounts. 
48 Merges, supra note___, at 1592-1596. 
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assertion: often through the use of older patents,49 in cases in which copying is not alleged, and 
based on a technology in which the defendant has already invested considerable resources,   
thereby maximizing holdup. Today’s smartphone patent “wars” have been predated by patent 
“wars” over airplanes,50 diapers,51 and sewing machines.52 Others have compared the current 
disputes over technology patents to historical disputes over telegraph, aircraft, semiconductors, 
radio, and 3G cell phone patents.53  
Some of these comparisons are inapposite. Smartphone technology, for example is 
covered by an estimated 250,000 patents54 and the subject of numerous court battles between a 
diverse set of practicing companies, non-practicing entities, competitors, and others around the 
world, with diverse stakes and business models.55 The sewing machine patent wars, in contrast, 
resolved with a patent pool involving just nine patents and four members.56 The historical 
airplane and automobile patent incidents involved single patent “extorters,” namely the Wright 
Brothers and George Selden, and their tactics to have their patents extended and applied 
broadly.57 
Yet two historical precedents have much to offer. In the late 1800’s, according to 
                                                 
49 Cf Hayter, supra note ___, at 62-63 (describing the practice of agrarian patent rings of buying up “old claims, or 
‘bottom’ patent,” getting them reissued or continued, and asserting them en masse), Congressional Testimony infra 
note ___ (describing same in the railroad context), and Brian Love, supra note ___ (same). 
50 Of the early 1900s, described, e.g., in 
http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Wright_Bros/Patent_Battles/WR12.htm 
51 Of the 1980s, described, e.g., in Fred Warshofsky, THE PATENT WARS (Wiley & Sons 1994), pp. 18-28 (also 
discussing the microprocessor and related patent wars) 
52 Petra Moser and Ryan Lampe, Do patent pools encourage innovation? Evidence from the 19th-century sewing 
machine industry (NBER 2009), (describing the Sewing Machine “Wars” of 1846-1856), at p.7 available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15061. 
53 See presentation of David Kappos, at Princeton Conference, Patent Success or Failure, available at 
https://citp.princeton.edu/event/patent-success-or-failure/ <the presos aren’t posted yet>  
54 RPX Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 59 (Sept. 2, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/ 
edgar/data/1509432/000119312511240287/ds1.htm (“Based on our research, we believe there are 
more than 250,000 active patents relevant to today’s smartphones . . . ”). 
55 See, e.g., Layne-Farrar, Anne, The Brothers Grimm Book of Business Models: A Survey of Literature and 
Developments in Patent Acquisition and Litigation (March 21, 2012), available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2030323 (listing a variety of business models and 24 disputes brought in 4Q2011-1Q2012 
in a variety of venues); Florian Mueller, “List of 50+ Apple-Samsung lawsuits in 10 countries”, Foss Patents , Apr. 
28, 2012, http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/04/list-of-50-apple-samsung-lawsuits-in-10.html (listing 50+ suits 
between Samsung and Apple alone, in multiple venues) (last visited May, 27, 2012). Martin Kenney & Bryan Pon, 
Structuring the Smarphone Industry: Is the Mobile Internet OS Platform Key?, 11 J. Ind. Compet. & Trade 239 
(2011) (describing the number of players in the smartphone industry and the diversity of their stakes). 
56 Ryan Lampe & Petra Moser, Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation? Evidence from the 19th-Century Sewing 
Machine Industry 7, Appendix A (June 8, 2010), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1308997, Singer, 
Wheeler & Wilson, Grover & Baker, and Elias Howe were its members). 
57 See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 
889–90 (1990).  Similarly, the “Telephone patent war” that some have tried to compare to the current situation 
focused on two patents held by inventor Alexander Graham Bell. See Kenneth Lustig, No, the Patent System is Not 
Broken, FORBES LEADERSHIP FORUM, Feb. 9, 2012, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/2012/02/09/no-the-patent-system-is-not-broken/ (last visited 
May 30, 2012); see also Overland Telephone Company v. American Bell Telephone Company, 126 U.S. 1 (1888).  
In contrast to reforming the patent system generally, patent “reform” efforts were focused on addressing problematic 
patents specifically, for example by opposing extensions to their terms. 
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Congressional record and historical accounts, the patenting of agricultural tools produced a 
“flood” of patents until “practically every device or tool that the farmer had” was covered by a 
patent.58 Patents covered “the most insignificant things” and there were “so many patents to 
different people on the same article” that “farmers had neither the time, money, nor skill ‘to 
wade through the vast labyrinth’” of patent rights.59 Patentees sold their patents to patent 
“royalty agents” that would demand fees from farmers,60 who, due to their lack of experience 
with patent law, financing, and access to skillful representation61 were easier to collect from than 
manufacturers and more willing to pay royalty fees to escape costly litigation.62  Patents were 
also used anticompetitively by patent “rings,” groups of manufacturers that controlled various 
essential articles and used various tactics to get their patents reissued with broadened scope.63 
They used their patents to “drive out competitors by compelling them either to sell or assign their 
patents or pay a royalty fee for every article manufactured.”64 
 During the same era, according to the chief historian of this period in patent history 
Steven Usselman, the railroad industry was “besieged” by lawsuits brought by “avaricious patent 
agents”65 who bought up patents.66 Railroad managers themselves initially sought few patents, 
not because they did not innovate but because the industry was “so dynamic that railroad 
managers assumed they would profit more from the open exchange of technical information than 
they would by securing exclusive rights to specific inventions.”67 This led to extensive 
infringement, sometimes willful.68 Companies were taken by surprise as the increasing 
complexity of railroad technology exposed them to lawsuits over their use of technology “that 
they had assumed either had become generic or were covered by patents for which they had paid 
a nominal fee.”69  
                                                 
58 Earl W. Hayter, The Patent System and Agrarian Discontent, 1875-1888, 34 MISS. VALLEY HIST’L. REV. 1 (1947) 
59, 61. 
59 Id., at 63. 
60 Id., at 61. 
61 Id., at 64.  
62 Id., at 61. 
63 Id. at 62 (citing Arguments before the Committee on Patents, Senate Miscellaneous Documents, No. 50, 45 Cong., 
2 Sess., 362-63; Prairie Farmer, XLIV (1873), 297; Buck, Granger Movement, 118-19). 
64 Id. at 63. See also id. at 65 (citing some farmers were subjected to multiple royalty demands on the same tool.).  
65 Steven W. Usselman and Richard R. John, Patent Politics: Intellectual Property, the Railroad Industry, and 
the Problem of Monopoly, 18 J. Policy Hist. 96, 99 (2006); STEVEN W. USSELMAN, REGULATING RAILROAD 
INNOVATION: BUSINESS, TECHNOLOGY, AND POLITICS IN AMERICA, 1840-1920, at 116  (2002) [hereinafter 
REGULATING RAILROAD] (describing the activities of patent dealers Chittenden and Sayles who bought up patents 
and sued a whole industry based on them in particular).  
66 “There is now growing up a class of men in the country who, when they find an invention in successful use, go to 
the Patent Office and rake over all the patent files to see if they can find an old patent which will supersede the later 
successful one, and then buy it up for a mere nominal sum.  After obtaining a reissue, if needed, they commence an 
onslaught on legitimate business.” U.S. Senate, Arguments before the Committees on Patents of the Senate and the 
House of Representatives in Support of and Suggesting Amendments to Bills (S. 300 and H.R. 16I2) to Amend the 
Statutes in Relation to Patents, and for Other Purposes, 45th Cong., 2d Sess., miscellaneous document no. 50, 304 
[hereinafter Arguments before the Committees] (statement of Mr. Hyde).  
67 Id. at 104. While railroads did not compete on patents, they did compete on other government-granted privileges 
over, for example, particular rights of way. 
68 Id. at 106-107. (“[i]f a patentee asked for an unreasonable price or there was a dispute over priority between 
multiple patentees, the railroads were more than willing to refuse any fee and simply infringe the patent.”). 
69 Id. at 105.  
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Modern and historic suits also had similar motivations. These days, patent assertion 
entities serve a market need by overcoming the obstacles to patent monetization and providing a 
“path to liquidity” for invention assets.70 The growth in railroad litigation was fueled in large part 
by the challenges faced by independent inventors in getting support for their inventions, due to 
the sophistication and built-in advantages of the railroads. For example, “[i]f railroad managers 
detected a conflict between two patented inventions, they might refuse to purchase either one, 
confident they could fend off an infringement suit by contending that the ownership of the 
product or process in question remained in dispute.”71  
While distinct, the patent disputes over agrarian, railroad, and modern technology patents 
present a common story, that a practice and an industry has formed to exploit three basic facts: 
A. Pervasive and Inadvertent Infringement of Patents Covering the Basic Building Blocks of the 
Economy 
The patenting of incremental inventions, historically and recently, has led to inadvertent 
infringement across industries that make and use technology. There are now a growing number 
of software and computer patents.72 Many cover small improvements to the basic building blocks 
of commerce. Individuals and companies have recently been sued over their use of social 
media,73 internet solicitations,74 and pop-up advertising.75 A century ago, railroads were sued 
over paints, lubricants, office machinery, and electrical equipment.76 Basic farm tools were 
covered by numerous patents; according to a historical account, “there were as many as 20 
patents on an ordinary coal stove, 647 on a corn planter, 378 on a corn sheller, and 6,211 on the 
different parts of a plow.”77 The result in each case: pervasive and inadvertent infringement of 
patents that cover the basic building blocks of the economy, by businesses that make and use 
technology. There has also historically been systemic underenforcement, due to the high cost of 
assertion by practicing entities.78 The sheer number of patents has made certain market-based 
                                                 
70 Described, e.g., in Chien, Of Trolls, supra note __, at 108. 
71 Usselman and John, supra note ___at 105. 
72 For modern patent proliferation, see Figure 1. Historically: “By the end of the Civil War, the number of railroad-
specific patents had increased from fifty per year to more than five hundred.” Usselman and John, supra note __, at 
104.  Hayter, supra note __, at 61 (documenting the increase in agricultural patents from 400 in 1863 to 1800 in 
1866). 
73 EveryMD v. Rick Santorum, Mitt Romney, Newt Gingrich, et al., No. CV12-01623 (C.D. Cal. filed Feb. 27, 2012), 
available at http://www.patentlyo.com/files/everymdcomplaintasfiled022712-1.pdf. 
74 Ziarno v. Am. Red Cross, No. 99 C 3430 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 2001). 
75 Stephanie Olsen, Patent owner stakes claim in Net ad suit, CNET NEWS, Jan. 7, 2004, http://news.cnet.com/2100-
1024_3-5136909.html (last visited May 28, 2012). 
76 Usselman and John, supra note ___, at 104. 
77 See Hayter, infra note, ____,  at 63, FN 13. (“It was claimed there were as many as 20 patents on an ordinary coal 
stove, 647 on a corn planter, 378 on a corn sheller, and 6,211 on the different parts of a plow.”) (citing 8 CONG. REC. 
at 269, 307, 1372.). 
78 Described, e.g., in Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 Tex. L.Rev. 283, 291- (2011) (HENRY 
CHESBROUGH, EMERGING SECONDARY MARKETS FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: US AND JAPAN 
COMPARISONS 31 (2006) (citing David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for 
Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285 (1986)), available at 
http://www.inpit.go.jp/blob/katsuyo/pdf/download/H17esm-e.pdf.  
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solutions, such as patent clearance79 economically unfeasible. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: 2001-2011 US Patent Software Applications  
(Keywords: “Computer” and “Software” in the Spec) 
 
 
 
Source: Author Analysis, Using Cambia’s PatentLens 
 
B. Specialized and Invulnerable Patent Plaintiffs 
In both historical and contemporary times, patent plaintiffs have enjoyed the benefits of 
specialization. Modern patents have been transferred to outside entities that do not practice 
them.80 Likewise agricultural inventors transferred patents to “royalty agents,” who split the 
proceeds from assertion with them.81 This revenue-sharing model has been used by modern 
patent assertion entities (PAEs) such as Acacia82 that focus wholly on the monetization of patents 
                                                 
79 Described, e.g., in Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 Tex. L.Rev. 283 (2011). See also James Bessen & 
Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 1 (2005). 
80 Described, e.g. in Chien, Arms Race, supra not __, at Abstract. 
81 Hayter, supra note ___, at 61 (“They could either collect damages from producers for infringing their patents, 
which they seldom chose to do, for litigation with corporations was expensive, or they could take the other 
alternative and collect royalty fees from purchasers. Since these articles were purchased by farmers who were much 
easier to collect from than manufacturers, the royalty agents began to visit the rural areas during the period under 
discussion.”). 
82 Acacia Research Group LLC, 2012 Presentation, available at 
http://acaciatechnologies.com/ACTGPresentation1stQtr2012.pdf, p.5 (last visited May 28,2012) (stating “Acacia 
partners with patent owners (50/50)”). 
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rather than the commercialization of technology. Past railroad suits were brought by inventors as 
well as “patent speculators.”83 In an incident eerily reminiscent of the public statement of 
embarrassment by a Yahoo! engineer that his former employer was suing Facebook in 2012,84 a 
railroad company issued a “contrite” apology that its patent had fallen into the hands of a patent 
dealer, to those threatened with litigation over it, in 1869.85  
In both eras, patent “speculators” have turned being out of the market into an 
advantage.86 Unlike companies who sell products, specialized plaintiffs are invulnerable to 
counter accusations of infringement, distractions from the core business, and reputational and 
brand damage among consumers. PAEs and patent speculators don’t have to abide by industry 
norms which have traditionally favored patent stalemate rather than war.87 By focusing solely on 
patent assertion, PAEs can enjoy economies of scale88 and reduce the risks of assertion including 
through financing mechanisms89 built, for example, around contingency fee lawyers.90 While 
practicing companies typically want freedom to operate, patent assertion entities enjoy freedom 
to litigate, and therefore gain leverage by pursuing high-stakes injunctions and damages.  
 When practicing companies sue competitors opportunistically, they may also enjoy have 
special advantages, for example “ultra powerful” standards essential patents. In the late 1800s, 
suits by George Westinghouse based on patents over his air-brakes, which quickly became an 
industry standard, “deeply troubled” policymakers.91 The infringement may be unavoidable: 
recently, both houses of Congress held hearings addressing the potentially unfair use of patents 
                                                 
83 U.S. Senate, "Arguments Before the Committees on Patents of the Senate and the House of Representatives in 
Support of and Suggesting Amendments to Bills (S. 300 and H.R. 16I2) to Amend the Statutes in Relation to 
Patents, and for Other Purposes," 45th Cong., 2d sess., miscellaneous document no. 50, 79 (Mr. Hyde). 
84  Andy Baio, A Patent Lie: How Yahoo Weaponized My Work, WIRED EPICENTER, Mar. 13, 2012,  
http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2012/03/opinion-baio-yahoo-patent-lie/ (last visited May 28, 2012). 
85 REGULATING RAILROAD, supra note __, at 116, FN 61 (Had this transfer been avoided “he certainly would have 
granted permission to use the device without charge throughout the system.”). 
86 In other words, the business model of “Being Infringed,” see Markus G. Reitzig, Joachim Henkel, and Christopher 
Heath, On Sharks, Trolls, and Other Patent Animals - 'Being Infringed' as a Normatively Induced Innovation 
Exploitation Strategy, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=885914. 
87 See Chien, Arms Race (describing the historic patent peace that has prevented companies from driving each other 
out of business with patents, even though they probably could). 
88 See Chien, Forbes (2011) (“They sue multiple defendants at the same time. They use the same patents over and 
over again. They show up in the same courtrooms, using the same set of counsel. Trolls capture economies of scale 
in litigation, and lower their committed capital by using contingent fee lawyers. Though trolls don’t make anything, 
this may be their real “product:” a safer, cheaper way to monetize patents.”). 
89 Id. Chien. Forbes (2011); see also Tom Ewing. Introducing the patent privateers, IAM Magazine, Jan/Feb 2011, 
at 31. 
90For a description of this phenomenon, see  William Gallaher, Trademark and Copyright Enforcement in the 
Shadow of IP Law (September 2, 2011). Santa Clara Computer and High Technology Law Journal, Vol. 28, 2012, 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1990588; see also Schwartz, David L., The Rise of Contingent Fee 
Representation in Patent Litigation (March 23, 2012). Alabama Law Review, Forthcoming, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1990651. 
91 Usselman and Richard, supra note ___ at 108, (“The public clamor for air brakes became intense, and legislation 
mandating their installation was seriously debated not only in several states but also in Congress. Seizing the 
moment, Westinghouse negotiated lucrative air-brake contracts with several large railroads, and sued others for 
patent infringement. Westinghouse’s conduct deeply troubled [the Railroad Commissioner].)” 
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essential to complying with a standard.92 
C. Settlements Driven By the Cost of Avoiding Legal costs and Remedies, Rather Than the 
Economic Value of The Patent (“patent nuisance fee economics”) 
Historical and modern patentees have also relied on “patent nuisance fee economics,” a 
term I use to describe the incentive that exists to assert patents not because they are economically 
valuable but because defending against a patent demand can be expensive, and therefore induces 
settlement.93 This model takes advantage of the reality that if a lawsuit is threatened or filed, it’s 
often cheaper to settle than pay litigation expenses, even if the case appears to be weak.94 If the 
asserter has a large patent portfolio, the cost of evaluating it, even for the owner, has been 
described as a “a mind-boggling, budget-busting exercise to try to figure [] out with any degree 
of accuracy at all.”95 By agreeing to settle, the painful exercise of determining on a patent-by-
patent basis what products infringe what patent claims and their validity, as well as the 
appropriate royalty, as a court would, can largely, though not completely, be avoided. 
In the late 1800s, patent agents demanded payments from farmers for articles the farmers 
had purchased or made themselves.96 Thousands of cases were filed on behalf of single 
patentees, in venues inconvenient for their targets. In one example, attorneys reportedly prepared 
for more than 4,000 cases in Iowa on behalf of a single patentee with the likely result that 
“unwary and unsuspecting farmers” would pay the nuisance fee rather than “be dragged one 
hundred fifty miles away from their homes, at great inconvenience and expense.”97 Most farmers 
were too poor to mount any investigation or defense against the alleged patent rights,98 and 
settled.99 
 “Cost of defense” tactics have been utilized recently as well. In Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar 
                                                 
92 See Senate Judiciary Committee, July 11, 2012 Hearing on “Oversight of the Impact on Competition of Exclusion 
Orderes to enforces Standards-essential 
Patents,”http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=45dca2a38e7309da19dce3a4cc06b817) ; House 
Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Competition and the Internet, July 18, 2012 Hearing 
on “ "The International Trade Commission and Patent 
Disputes”http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/Hearings%202012/hear_07182012.html.  
93Inspired by David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 
Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 3 (1985). 
94 Two excellent papers that discuss why and how IP lawyers bring cases even when they are weak are: William T. 
Gallagher, , Trademark and Copyright Enforcement in the Shadow of IP Law (September 2, 2011), Santa Clara 
Computer and High Technology Law Journal, Vol. 28, 2012, and David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee 
Representation in Patent Litigation (March 23, 2012), Alabama Law Review, Forthcoming. available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1990651.  
95 Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy: Hearing Before the 
Fed. Trade Comm'n, supra note __, at 743 (statement of Fred Telecky, General Patent Counsel for Texas 
Instruments). 
96 Hayter, supra note __, at 65-66. 
97 Id. at 68 (describing Arguments before the Committee on Patents, Senate Miscellaneous Documents, No. 50, 45 
Cong., 2 Sess., 362-63; Prairie Farmer, XLIV (1873), 297; Buck, Granger Movement, 118-19). 
98 Magliocca, Blackberries, supra note ___, at 1824. 
99 Id. at 1823-24 (citing 11 CONG. REC. 1973 (1881) (statement of Sen. Voorhees: "The manufacturing company will 
stand on its legal rights and go into litigation quite as cheerfully as the other side, while the plain people of the 
country shrink from law, and justly so, as they would from contagion, small-pox, or any other great calamity.")). 
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Bancorp,100 the Federal Circuit affirmed an award of attorney’s fees in a case that displayed 
“‘indicia of extortion’” where a non-practicing entity filed a large number of cases in order to 
“exploit[] the high cost to defend complex litigation to extract a nuisance value settlement.” Each 
complaint was followed by a “demand for a quick settlement at a price far lower than the cost of 
litigation… based on the defendant’s annual sales: $25,000 for sales less than $3,000,000; 
$50,000 for sales between $3,000,000 and $20,000,000; and $75,000 for sales between 
$20,000,000 and $100,000,000.”101 Judge Davis of the Eastern District of Texas has singled out 
“plaintiffs who file cases with extremely weak infringement positions in order to settle for less 
than the cost of defense and have no intention of taking the case to trial. Such a practice is an 
abuse of the judicial system and threatens the integrity of and respect for the courts.”102 
Section II: How the Crises Arose and Resolved in the Past 
A. How the Crises Arose 
How did the historical crises arise? In the case of agrarian patents, according to a recent 
account, in 1869, the start of the agrarian patent crisis was the Patent Office’s creation of a new 
kind of design patent that enabled applicants to protect incremental functional designs. The 
change was codified by Congress the next year.103 Contemporary accounts blamed the patent 
office and its “laxity in administering the law” and practice of granting patents on “trifling 
modifications...not entitled to protection.”104 By 1874, groups sympathetic to farmer’s causes 
called on Congress to change the law.105 
Patent demands became so pervasive that in farmers found that they could not escape the 
patent system: “it is in our boots, it is in our clothes, it is in the tools we work with, in the buggy 
we ride in, in the harness on the horse, in the whip we strike him with. It is to be found in our 
fences, our gates, in our pumps, in our kitchen, in our food, and finally in our coffin.”106  
In the case of railroads, the “new economic order” brought by industrial development put 
pressure on many governmental institutions, including the patent system. The expanding 
economy generated a surge of patent activity that the patent office had a hard time keeping with 
and “significantly increasing the success rate of would-be patent holders.” 107 Similar things 
could be said of the digital revolution. The growing backlog has recently driven calls for more 
PTO fees to be allocated to hiring examiners, rather than diverted to other activities. Just as the 
                                                 
100 Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F. 3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011), available at 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/opinions-orders/09-1308.pdf.   
101 Id. at 1326-1327. 
102 Raylon LLC v. Complus Data Innovations, et al., 6:09cv355, 356, 357 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2011). On the filing of 
weak cases in IP cases, see Gallagher, supra note  ___, generally.  See also Schwartz, Contingent Litigation, supra 
note ___ (noting that the strength or weakness of a case is in the eye of the beholders, with plaintiffs and defendants 
holding widely divergent views). 
103 Magliocca , Barnyards, supra note __ at 1820. See Ex parte Crane, C.D. 7 (1869), reprinted in HECTOR T. 
FENTON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR DESIGNS 225 (Philadelphia, Campbell ed. 1889). At the time, the 
Patent Office played an expanded role in the patent system. (cite/paraphrase) 
104 Hayter, supra note __ at 65-66. 
105 Hayter, supra note __ at 77 (describing the National Grange convention) and 78 (discussing other farmer interest 
groups).  
106 Hayter, supra note __ at 64 (citing an 1879 farmer statement). 
107 Usselman and John, supra note___ at 99 (2006). 
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large number of patent applications did in the late 1800s.108 Patent demands brought by 
practicing companies and patent outsiders alike and high-profile suits involving double-acting 
and air brakes, sleeper cars, and a variety of railroad safety equipment caused the railroads great 
anxiety and drove them to get organized.  
Through their specialized industry groups such as the Eastern and Western Railroad 
Associations (the ERA and WRA), the railroads hired patent attorneys and coordinated defense 
efforts for the entire industry. These efforts included lobbying Congress and the courts, settling 
cases, and other forms of self-help.109  
B. How the Crises Resolved 
In the name of agrarian patent reform, an innocent user defense was introduced in several 
forms110 to curb the “[harassment of][] people with vexatious suits about that of which they 
never could by any possibility have had knowledge.”111 Another amendment would shift fees to 
plaintiffs if the economic value of their suit was low or they lost in order to discourage frivolous 
suits and end, “wholesale raiding upon innocent people.” 112 Schemes to eliminate injunctive 
relief for certain patents and set the licensing rate ex ante, by statute113 or in connection with the 
issuance or payment of renewal of patents were also proposed.114 Railroads pressed for a statute 
                                                 
108 Id. at 102 (“Patent commissioners grumbled about the financial drain [other priorities] posed: they would have 
preferred to use funds to hire more patent examiners.”). 
109 Described supra, Section ___. 
110 Sen. Windom’s Proposal: “No recovery of damages or costs shall be had against the defendant in any suit 
brought for the alleged infringement of a patent by the use of any patented device, process, invention, or discovery, 
if it shall appear that the defendant purchased the same for his own private use from the manufacturer thereof or 
from a dealer engaged in the open sale of the same, unless it shall also appear that the defendant at the time of such 
purchase had knowledge or actual notice of the existence of such patent.”  8 CG 269. An alternative version of this 
reform would have eliminated liability for innocent consumers of patented products. The National Grange petitioned 
Congress to “amend the patent laws of America as to make the manufacturer or vendor alone responsible for 
infringement in the sale of patented articles.” 10 Cong. Rec. 101, 102 (1880) (statement of Sen. Butler introducing 
the petition). 
111 “Now, the object of this amendment is to prevent the oppression and the great injustice that is being perpetrated 
upon hundreds of thousands of innocent people by means of the patent law… I want to free [the user][]from such 
harassing and vexatious suits. Give the patentee his full redress against the vender, against the manufacturer, or 
against the man who has knowledge of the patent, but do not send him into every farmhouse and cottage in this 
country to harass the people with vexatious suits about that of which they never could by any possibility have had 
knowledge. That is the object of this amendment.”  8 Cong. Rec 269 (1879). 
112 The proposal: “[i]f the plaintiff shall not recover the sum of $20 or over, the court shall adjudge him to pay his 
own costs, unless it shall also appear that the defendant at the time of such purchase, manufacture, or practical 
application, had knowledge or actual notice of the existence of such patent.” 8 Cong. Rec. 652, 660 (1879). Senator 
Windom explained that the purpose of the change would be to “[c]ompel these men to give security for costs and 
then inform them that such suits must be conducted at their own expense, and we shall hear no more of wholesale 
raiding upon innocent people.” 8 Cong Rec 303 (1879) (Sen. Windom). 
113 Senator Christiancy proposed “[t]here is still another class of cases in which, for patents hereafter to be issued, to 
prevent extortion, some rate of compensation should be fixed by the statute . . . when the infringement consists in 
using the thing patented.” 8 CONG. REC. 291, 308 (1878). 
114 “A number of state granges proposed that, when patents were issued or renewed, a definite royalty fee be set and 
paid to the patentee; in return for this payment could construct and sell such improved machines and thus bring them 
into immediate use.” Hayter, supra note __, at 77. (citing Iowa State Grange, Proceedings, IV (1873), 44-45; 
Michigan State Grange, Proceedings, II (1875), 42; Kansas State Grange, Proceedings (Topeka), VIaII (1880), 8). 
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of limitations on claims of infringement.115 There was a proposal to adopt European style 
renewal fees on granted patents.116  A new way of calculating damages – by using an established 
license fee or profits from sales and doing away with a legal principle called the doctrine of 
savings – was suggested.117 
The railroads and other supporters of patent reform expended significant money and time 
to convince Congress to change patent law.118  
 
1.  What Didn’t Work: Broad, Substantive Legislative Proposals Across the Patent System 
 
Most of these legislative proposals failed. They failed because, in solving the problems of 
farmers and railroads, they would, it was perceived, create problems for other parts of the patent 
system. It appeared for example, and rightly so, that “patent reforms brought forth by the railroad 
were done for the railroads [sic] self-interest.”119 Likewise, the “hardship” experienced by 
farmers was seen “hardly a sufficient justification[] for abolishing that system of patents which 
has accomplished so much in this country.”120 Fee-shifting proposals were rejected as unfairly 
punishing patentees with lawful claims, but low damages.121 Suggestions to reform damages 
were seen as self-serving because few others suffered from the doctrine of savings that the 
railroads complained about.122  In addition, they appeared to hinder judges and juries with their 
specificity.123   
The changes were portrayed as helping large companies, at the expense of small 
inventors.124  Individual inventor Thomas Edison claimed that they would “strongly tend to 
discourage and prevent the perfection of useful inventions.”125 Companies in other industries 
likewise opposed any changes.  Their opposition was focused mainly on the isolated nature of 
patent shark attacks.  Most industries and inventors had nothing to do with patent sharks.  As 
such, they saw no need to limit their patent rights because of a problem that did not affect them.  
In addition, as has been said recently, Congressional change is subject to numerous “veto 
                                                 
115 Regulating Railroad, supra note ___, at 145. 
116 Id. 
117 Id.  
118 Regulating Railroad, supra note ___, at 154-155. 
119 U.S. Senate, "Arguments before the Committees on Patents of the Senate and the House of Representatives in 
Support of and Suggesting Amendments to Bills (S. 300 and H.R. 16I2) to Amend the Statutes in Relation to 
Patents, and for Other Purposes," 45th Cong., 2d Sess., miscellaneous document no. 50, 304 [hereinafter Arguments 
before the Committees], at 69. 
120 Id. 
121 This amendment “would absolutely prevent, practically at least, the bringing of any suit simply to settle the 
question of the validity of a patent, or the infringement, where the damages were not considerable.” 8 Cong. Rec. 
570 (1879) (Sen. Wadleigh). 
122 Usselman, Regulating Railroads, supra note __, at 159. 
123 Id. 
124 Id.  
125 See Hayter, supra note __ at 81 (“Thomas. A. Edison, in opposing the bill of 1879, stated in a letter to Butler: "I 
am sure that this provision will not only act oppressively upon many inventors, but will strongly tend to discourage 
and prevent the perfection of useful inventions by those most fitted for that purpose, and most likely to accomplish 
it.... It would be very burdensome to me.") Citing Thomas A. Edison to Butler, February 17, 1879, Butler Papers. 
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players,” and “legislative priorities are often unduly skewed by political expediency.”126 
2. What Did Work: Narrowly-Tailored, Specific Reform 
 
a. Abolishing Agrarian Patents  
 
Where these proposals failed, more tailored changes to the law, accomplished largely 
outside of the legislative process, succeeded. A period of confusion during which the Patent 
Office “flip-flopped” several times about what should be considered patentable under the design 
law followed the change that precipitated the agrarian patent crisis.127 According to legal 
historian Gerard Magliocca,“[i]nstability in patent law eventually became a major concern, and 
Congress was forced to step in and restore order.”128 Congress codified a stricter standard in 
1902.129 The Patent Office applied this more stringent standard, making it harder to get patents 
on trivial advances,130 and complaints about patent sharks subsided. Reform took time –thirty 
years elapsed prior between the two Congressional amendments that bookended the period of 
patent “crisis.” 
b. Courts, Self-Help Through Railroad Associations, and Challenging Railroad Patents 
In the case of railroad patents, reform was led by the Court and railroad associations 
rather than Congress. Though many legislative fixes were proposed, none really succeeded as 
“Congress could not accommodate the special concerns of railroads without sacrificing essential 
features of a patent system that still functioned quite capably in most segments of the 
economy.”131  
How, eventually, did the crises abate? According to historical accounts, ourt leadership 
and self-help were critical. Supreme Court Justice Joseph P. Bradley, an ex-railroad man himself, 
through a series of decisions regulating the railroad industry, has been credited with meticulously 
and carefully helping. In Railway Company v. Sayles, he “avoided making any sweeping 
pronouncements [][about] the doctrine of savings… instead, honed in on the specific details of 
the patent claims []advanced,”132 to invalidate the patents at stake. In other decisions, he ruled for 
the patentee, but based on specifics that “kept patent law relatively unencumbered by abstract 
principles.”133 However, his views on the patent system became clear in his 1883 Atlantic Works 
v. Brady decision, that:  
                                                 
126 Arti Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations for Policy Development 61 Duke 
Law J., 1237, 1266 (2012) 
127 Gerard N. Magliocca, Ornamental Design and Incremental Innovation, 86 Marq. L. Rev. 845, 878-879 (2003) 
(hereinafter “Ornamental Design”).  
128 Id., 879. 
129 Ornamental Design, supra note __, at 879. See P.L. 57-109; 35 U.S.C. §73 (1902). (by deleting the word “useful” 
and spurring the PTO to “taking the hint,” applying a stricter interpretation of patentability.)  
130 Ornamental Design, supra note __, at 879. 
131 See Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. Raff and Peter Temin, editors, LEARNING BY DOING IN MARKETS, 
FIRMS, AND COUNTRIES, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS (1999), at 76-77. See also Steven Usselman, Patents, 
Engineering Professionals, and the Pipelines of Innovation: The Internalization of Technical Discovery by 
Nineteenth-Century American Railroads. 
132 Usselman, Patent Politics, supra note ___, at 116. 
133 Usselman, Patent Politics, supra note ___, at 118. 
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“To grant a single party a monopoly of every slight advance made, except where the 
exercise of invention somewhat above ordinary mechanical or engineering skill is 
distinctly shown, is unjust in principle and injurious in its consequences . . . 
 
It was never the object of [the patent] laws to grant a monopoly for every trifling device, 
every shadow of a shade of an idea, which would naturally and spontaneously occur to 
any skilled mechanic or operator in the ordinary progress of manufacturers. Such an 
indiscriminate creation of exclusive privileges tends rather to obstruct than to stimulate 
invention. 
 
It creates a class of speculative schemers, who make it their business to watch the 
advancing wave of improvement and gather its foam in the form of patented monopolies, 
which enable them to lay a heavy tax upon the industry of the country without 
contributing anything to the real advancement of the art. It embarrasses the honest 
pursuit of business with fears and apprehensions of concealed liens and unknown 
liabilities to law suits and vexatious accountings for profits made in good faith.”134 
 
This decision supported the already formidable defense efforts mounted by the major railroad 
associations, trade groups that worked to for example, identify relevant prior art, coordinate 
responses, and work towards a common goal of providing its members with freedom to 
operate.135 These efforts were credited with driving down railroad patent litigation136 and are 
described below, in the “self-help” section. 
Section III: Implications for Current Proposals 
A. Problem-Framing and Designing Patent Reform 
Although much has been accomplished with respect to patent reform, great dissatisfaction 
remains. As firms watch others make money137 and build firm reinvigoration strategies off of 
patents,138 the practice of patent assertion is expected intensify, rather than abate, in the short-
term.139 As quickly as patent institutions have moved to reform the patent system, the market has 
arguably moved even faster, introducing new sources of capital, business models, and tactics140 
to the business of patent assertion. For these reasons, efforts to reform patents continue, with 
                                                 
134 Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192 (1883), 199–200. 
135 Usselman, Regulating Railroads, supra note ___, at 171-176. 
136 Usselman, Regulating Railroads, supra note ___, at 174-175. 
137 For example, through the successful stock prices of well-managed company Acacia, whose approximate value 
has increased 1000%, from a low of $2.50 in 2008 to a low of $28.76 in 2012 thus far, financial data available at 
http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=ACTG 
138 For a recent example Mike Masnick, “Early Mobile Internet Company That Failed to Adapt Becomes Patent 
Troll,” Tech Dirt (April 18, 2012) http://www.techdirt.com/blog/wireless/articles/20120418/03490318538/early-
mobile-internet-company-that-failed-to-adapt-becomes-patent-troll.shtml [add parenthetical] 
139 In accordance with customary demonstration effects in the patent world, described e.g., in Chien, Arms Race, 
supra note ___.  
140 See, e.g., Chien, Forbes, supra note ___   Patent Law Institute 2012 Program IP Monetization 2012: Maximize 
the Value of Your IP Assets, chair Jose Esteves (describing various financing and legal vehicles for patent 
monetization) described at 
http://www.pli.edu/Content/Seminar/IP_Monetization_2012_Maximize_the_Value_of/_/N-
4kZ1z1330y?ID=142943. 
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several proposals receiving attention.  
 Addressing the three problems of too many patents, invulnerable patent defendants, and 
patent nuisance fee economics, these proposals include: (1) reducing the number of software 
patents including by abolishing them, (2) bolstering patent defenses including through an 
independent invention defense, and (3) changing the economics of patent litigation, including 
through fee-shifting, as well as (4) self-help attempts; their historical counterparts, and what past 
experiences can teach. This section focuses on these and related proposals and the lessons that 
can be gleaned from analogous reforms. 
How the problem is framed informs the solution. Alternative arguments that the single 
“problem” is really the patents (software patents or at least certain software patents), the people 
(trolls), or their specific behavior (nuisance tactics), are each convincing.  But each category of 
“offense” contains a wide variety of practices. Though the claim is often made that most 
software patents are trivial and do not promote innovation, there are exceptions. For example, the 
PageRank patent, over a search algorithm, arguably enabled search technology to be transferred 
from Stanford University to Google.141 Trolls also come in different types. Although all of them, 
according to my definition, use patents primarily for litigation and licensing rather than to 
support technology transfer and commercialization, they do so in different ways. RPX 
Corporation estimates that inventors, who often assert a single or handful of patents comprise 
18% of non-practicing entity (NPE) litigants and sue fewer defendants, while “licensing entities” 
bring the bulk of suits (69%) and serial NPEs like Acacia bring 15% of them.142 While Acacia is 
a high-volume, repeat player in patent assertion, individual inventors are more likely to sue in a 
“one-off” capacity. 
Each “problem” also yields different solutions, with their own tradeoffs. A way to 
consider them is with respect to the common yardsticks of: precision – are they overly broad or 
under inclusive; effectiveness – would they operate only on existing patents, future patents, only 
litigated patents, or all of the above; and fairness – would they exacerbate existing inequalities 
for example that disfavor inventors lacking in resources? What institution implements the reform 
matters– improved patent examination impacts only future patents, while courts can in one 
decision impact all patents, existing, future, litigated and unlitigated. 143 So do the issues of costs 
of implementation and circumvention – how easily can a new rule be circumvented or skirted; 
and the? 
These and are other concerns inform the analysis below. 
B. Proposals to Reduce the Number of Patents 
                                                 
141 See, e.g. Colleen Chien, Race to the Bottom, Intellectual Asset Management Magazine Jan/Feb 2012. 
142 RPX Corporation Analyst Day Presentation, March 8, 2012, at 2, available at 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ABEA-5XYKB4/2003662716x0x551346/409b5f43-ce6b-4ae3-993d-
264e383845b1/RPX%20Analyst%20Day%20v4.pdf 
143 See David Schwartz, Retroactivity in Patent Law, ____Ala. Law Rev.___ (2012) (Forthcoming), available at  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1945554 (describing the retroactive nature of court decisions and arguing that because 
patent lawyers circumvent court decisions through clever drafting, the decisions primarily impact preexisting, rather 
than prospective, patents). But see also Arti Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations 
for Policy Development  61 Duke Law Journal 101, ____ (2012) (describing how courts are mindful of and try to 
limit the retroactive impact of their decisions.) 
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1.  “Abolish software patents”  
 If the problem is too many patents, why not eliminate a large class of them, namely 
software patents? Software patents have been singled out for elimination due to their perceived 
vagueness, low-quality, and non-essential relationship to innovation. As a solution called for by 
many quarters,144 to apply specifically to problematic patents rather than to the patent system 
generally,145 the idea of abolishing software patents has enormous popular appeal. It also has 
historical and recent precedent. According to Gerard Magliocca, “abolishing” agricultural design 
patents is what ultimately resolved the agrarian patent crisis.146 The regulation of business 
method patents, through the “second pair of eyes” (“SPER”) program, the application of the old 
prior user rights defense only to business method patents,147 and the Act’s business method 
specific provisions,148 represents a recent attempt to minimize the perceived harms associated 
with a certain type of patent. 
 
Each of these experiences contains lessons for how, assuming it is the goal, software 
patents might be abolished.  Though, it should be noted, the courts seem to be well on their way 
to abolishing certain types of software patents already. In Bilski, the Supreme Court rejected the 
low bar of having a “useful, concrete, and tangible” result that had been used to police 
patentability for over a decade. Applying it, the Federal Circuit has found unpatentable a 
software product for detecting internet-based credit card fraud,149 a computer-implemented 
method for processing car loan applications,150 a tax-avoiding real estate investment tool reciting 
computer-aided steps,151 and computer related financial claims.152  In Prometheus,153 a case 
about medical diagnostic methods, the Supreme Court cited precedents about software patents, 
made comments about abstract ideas, and, based on the case, sent back to the Federal Circuit for 
review a patent over watching an advertisement in order to access copyrighted content over the 
internet the appellate court had found valid.154  
                                                 
144 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other 
Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 Emory L.J. 1025 (1990), and over 20 years later, see 
http://www.feld.com/wp/archives/tag/abolish-software-patents. 
145 As conceived, at least. However, the redefinition of patentable subject matter it has prompted is arguably having 
implications for other sorts of patents as well. 
146 Magliocca, Barnyards supra note ___, at 1832. 
147 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2000) (“It shall be a defense to an action for infringement [] with respect to a [business method 
patent] [that] [] if such person had, [] actually reduced the subject matter to practice at least 1 year before the 
effective filing date of such patent, and commercially used the subject matter before the effective filing date[].”),the 
2012 America Invents Act made this defense effective against all patents, not just design patents. 
148 Including the outlawing of tax method patents and Section 18, both described supra, at section ____. These 
portions of the AIA have been called “a rifleshot earmark []for a special industry,” meaning banks. 157 CONG. REC. 
at S5408. 
149 CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1367 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 16, 2011). 
150 Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 2012 WL 164439, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 20, 2012). 
151 Fort Properties, Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC, No. 2009-1242, at *2, *12 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 27, 2012). 
152 Bancorp Services, L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), --- F.3d ----, 2012 WL 3037176 (Fed. Cir. 
2012), at *2. But see CLS Bank Intern. v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 103 U.S.P.Q.2d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding 
computerized stock trading platform claims to pass 101 muster, leading some to declare a circuit split within the 
Federal Circuit). 
153 Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012). 
154 WildTangent v. Ultramercial (Supreme Court May 21, 2012) Docket No 11-962 (opinion granting, vacating and 
remanding the case to the Federal Circuit). 
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a. The Definitional Issue 
One of the biggest challenges to “abolishing software patents” is the question of what 
exactly is a “software patent”? Academics disagree on where the line should be,155 and wherever 
the courts or PTO place it,156 practitioners will try to avoid it through clever drafting.157 Many 
believe that these realities make for efforts to fit software inventions into permissible or 
impermissible categories “pointless.”158 
History does not support such a conclusion. For example, it’s arguably as hard to define a 
“business method” patent as it is to define a “software” patent. That hasn’t stopped Congress 
from regulating “method[s] of doing or conducting business,” through the prior user rights 
defense it passed in 1999,159 subdefining business methods through its invalidation of future tax 
strategy patents,160 and redefining them as part of the covered business method transitional 
program161 of the 2011 America Invents Act.   
                                                 
155 Major patent class-based attempts to do so include James Bessen, A Generation of Software Patents, Boston 
Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-31, footnote 68 (2011) ; Hall, Bronwyn H., Adam 
B. Jaffe, Manuel Trajtenberg, The NBER Patent Citation Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools, 
NBER Working Paper No. 8498. Appendix 1, p.41 (2001); Chien, Of Trolls, supra note ___ at footnote140, and 
Stuart J.H. Graham & David C. Mowery, Software Patents: Good News or Bad News? 14 (GaTech TI:GER 
Working Paper Series, 2004), available at http://tiger.gatech.edu/files/ gt_tiger_software.pdf. John Allison has 
handcoded thousands of patents over various projects, including John R. Allison & Ronald J. Mann, The Disputed 
Quality of Software Patents, 85 Wash. U. L. Rev. 297, 314 (2007); Arti K. Rai, John R. Allison, and Bhaven N. 
Sampat, Frontiers in Empirical Patent Law Scholarship: University Software Ownership and Litigation: A First 
Examination, 87 N.C.L. Rev. 1519 (2009); and our forthcoming project, “Can Automated Methods be Used to 
Identify Software Patents?” compares these and other definitions. 
156 See, e.g.,Robert W. Bahr, “Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in 
view of Bilski v. Kappos”, Memorandum to Patent Examining Corps. (July 27, 2010) available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/bilski_guidance_27jul2010.pdf. 
157 Googling “claim drafting tips” and “software” yields many examples. 
158 Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 1315 (2011) Abstract  
159 Described supra, section ____. 
160 Section 14 of the America Invents Act: “any strategy for reducing, avoiding, or deferring tax liability, whether 
known or unknown at the time of the invention or application for patent, shall be deemed insufficient to differentiate 
a claimed invention from the prior art.[] (c) EXCLUSIONS.—This section does not apply to that part of an 
invention that— (1) is a method, apparatus, technology, computer program product, or system, that is used solely for 
preparing a tax or information return or other tax filing, including one that records, transmits, transfers, or organizes 
data related to such filing; or (2) is a method, apparatus, technology, computer program product, or system used 
solely for financial management, to the extent that it is severable from any tax strategy or does not limit the use of 
any tax strategy by any taxpayer or tax advisor.” 
161 Section 18(d) of the America Invents Act: “For purposes of this section, the term ‘covered business method 
patent’ means a patent that claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other 
operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service, except that the term 
does not include patents for technological inventions.” See also Matal, supra note ____, at *113 et seq, recounting 
the fascinating, convoluted, and contentious history of section 18, in which “[b]usiness-method trolls fought a 
scorched-earth, office-by-office lobbying war with banks and retailers,” and covered business method patents is 
quite clearly defined, at least by certain Senators as not only including non-technical “business methods” pertaining 
to the financial services industry but software implemented inventions that cover “not only financial products and 
services, but also the “practice, administration and management” of a financial product or service. This language is 
intended to make clear that the scope of patents eligible for review under this program is not limited to patents 
covering a specific financial product or service. In addition to patents covering a financial product or service, the 
‘practice, administration and management’ language is intended to cover any ancillary activities related to a 
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Thus, the definitional issue may be a bit of a red herring– a working definition, rather 
than a perfect definition, may be what is really needed to discourage nuisance suits.  Congress 
has already drawn the business method line several times. The PTO will need to implement the 
definition of a “covered business method patent” as part of the AIA’s Section 18 transitional 
business method patent program.162 While debates about what should and shouldn’t be in this 
definition included continue,163 the PTO’s experience implementing the standard will be 
important to observe and learn from.   
Notably, Section 18 does not abolish all business method or software patents, but rather 
subjects those that fit the definition and are likely invalid to a higher level of scrutiny while 
shielding defendants from them. It may just be enough to chill litigation of particularly 
problematic patents.  
b. Towards a Working Line  
If not a perfect line, what would be a working line, to isolate problematic patents? 
Regardless of where it drawn, a successful rule would be one that would enable parties to a 
licensing discussion to look quickly at a patent and, based on them, agree upon which of its 
claims fit the given standard. That question will depend on how consistent the courts or PTO are 
in their determinations and the extent to which patentees try to assert patents, by themselves or 
en masse, that, though issued under a different standard, are likely now invalid.  It’s easy to 
argue about one particular patent, but if a whole portfolio is asserted against an entity, the costs 
of arguing about each one keep the cost of defense, and therefore the economic opportunity, 
high. 
c. Circumvention 
Even if it were possible to abolish all software patents, nuisance suits are based on other 
types of patents as well. In my analysis of troll suits from 2000-2008, I found that a significant 
number of patent suits involving hardware.164 Recently, Project Paperless LLC has recently 
approached small companies for licenses based on their use of PDF machines in alleged violation 
of a patent whose claim 1 recites “a computer data management system” with “at least one 
memory,” “at least one processor …” and also mentions a “scanner,” “digital copier”, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
financial product or service, including . . . marketing, customer interfaces, Web site management and functionality, 
transmission or management of data, servicing, underwriting, customer communications, and back office 
operations—e.g., payment processing, stock clearing.” See 157 CONG. REC. S1364–65 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) 
(statement of Sen. Schumer). One thing that aids in the identification of business method patents is that they are 
concentrated around a single class, Class 705. See Matal, supra note ___, at 116. (describing efforts to limit the 
definition of “covered business-method patent” to language that tracks the USPTO’s patent class 705). Software 
patents, in contrast, are harder to pin down. See John Allison ____ (describing dissatisfaction with the PTO’s classes 
and identifying software patents by reading each patent and classifying it based on its description and claims). For 
an interesting history of class 705, beginning with its creation in 1997 from the business and cost/price sections of 
computer classes 395 and 364, see Gene Quinn, Business Methods by the Numbers: A Look Inside the PTO Class 
705, IP Watchdog (January 12, 2012) available at http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/01/22/business-methods-by-
the-numbers-a-look-inside-pto-class-705/id=21892/. 
162 Id. Matal at ____  
163 See USPTO website “Changes To Implement Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents” (last 
visited August 2, 2012) http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/covered-business-method-comments.jsp. 
164 Chien, Of Trolls, supra note ___, (add parenthetical, numbers) 
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“digital imaging devices.”165 One can imagine trolls suing based on patents that are less abstract 
and more likely to be found patentable than “pure software” patents. There may be less to argue 
about with respect to these patents, because you can more easily tell what they cover and there 
may be fewer of them. However, where there is a colorable claim based on subject matter that 
clears subject matter eligibility standards, the business opportunity will remain. 
Potentially anticipating this, a recently advanced Congressional bill defines “software 
patent” broadly, to encompass hardware and software patents.166 However it may go too far and 
beyond its drafters’ intent. By including any process that “could be” implemented on a computer 
regardless of whether a computer is specifically mentioned in the patent, most if not all modern 
process patents that involve any sort of computation would be implicated. 
d. How Abolishment Was Accomplished  
The historical experience lends insight into what it means to “abolish” a certain type of 
patent or patent lawsuit. In the case of agricultural design patents, their “abolishment” was not 
achieved through any change to section 101. Rather, it was accomplished by making the low bar 
that applies to design patents no longer apply to patents covering functional farm tools.167 In that 
way it was more akin to raising the obviousness standard – farm patents could still be obtained, 
but only if they met the higher, utility patent, standard.  Thus, there are limits to a comparison 
between abolishing “trivial” agricultural patents and abolishing the entire class of software 
patents.  
Similarly, in the case of railroad patents, Justice Bradley’s ruling on a set of particular 
patents, covering double-acting brakes, and subsequent jurisprudence, including dicta,168 led to a 
“’surgical intervention’”169 in the field that produced industry-specific change. The railroads 
worked together to invalidate specific patents that were asserted against them, in contrast to the 
abolishment of an entire class of patents.170 
2. Tweaking Obviousness  
As just discussed, the agrarian example suggests that another way to reduce the number 
of patents is to the raise the bar and ensure that the scope of protection is commensurate to the 
patentee’s contribution. This approach has been used other times in history. Indeed, the 
                                                 
165 Patent 6,771,381. For a description of the cases see “Are Project Paperless’s Patents Valid,” Stop Project 
Paperless (April 16, 2012) http://stop-project-paperless.com/. 
166 From the 2012 SHIELD Act:“[a]ny process that could be implemented in a computer regardless of whether a 
computer is specifically mentioned in the patent" as well as any computer system programmed to carry out such a 
process. It defines a “computer” as an “electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data 
processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions.” 
167 By making the functional aspects of farm tools ineligible for design patent protection. Described supra, at section 
___. 
168 In the Atlantic Works v. Brady case, described supra at note___. See also Usselman, Patent Politics, at 119-121 
(describing the railroad industry’s reaction to this case and the efforts to find prior art, patent their own inventions, 
and engage in self-help, rather than just lobbying for legal help to solve the problem that it encouraged.) 
169 Merges, Trouble with Trolls, supra note ___ , at 1578. 
170 These efforts are described infra, at Section ___. 
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movement away from a registration-based system in 1836171 and the rise of peripheral claiming 
in the 1940s and 1950s172 were prompted by such concerns.173  
 
Throughout history, the Supreme Court has redefined obviousness standards.174 In 2007, 
the Supreme Court decided KSR v. Teleflex in which it made it easier to find an invention 
obvious.  Before KSR, the Patent Office needed to find a “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” in 
order to reject a patent as obvious. After KSR, it and courts could rely on many other rationales 
for doing so.175  By raising the standard, the Court attempted to distinguish ordinary innovations, 
which do not deserve patents, from patentable inventions, which do: “the results of ordinary 
innovation are not the subject of exclusive rights under the patent laws. Were it otherwise patents 
might stifle, rather than promote, the progress of useful arts.”176  
 
a. KSR’s Impact 
 
Nearly five years have elapsed since the Supreme Court decided KSR.  Empirical studies 
have confirmed that the decision has, indeed, made a difference, in the expected direction. The 
courts are more likely to find invalidate patents as obvious177 and to overturn lower court 
findings of non-obviousness. The Federal Circuit are more likely to leave intact findings of 
obviousness.178  
 
b. Transaction Costs 
 
The impact of KSR outside of the courtroom and where the vast majority of patent 
negotiations take place has been more mixed, however.  KSR doesn’t provide a bright line rule to 
                                                 
171 Described, e.g. in EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: 
AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1798-1836, at ____(1998) 
172 Described, in Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fenceposts or Signposts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 
157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009); Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1253 (2011).  
173 Mark Lemley’s recent proposal to curb the re-emergence of functional claiming has similar motivations. Mark 
Lemley, The Return of Functional Claiming, *34 available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2117302      
174 Recounted , e.g. in John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation. 86 Tex. Law Rev. 1 
(2007).  
175 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (rejecting the singular application of the Federal Circuit’s 
“teaching, suggestion, motivation” rationale for finding an invention obvious and suggesting that alternatives 
rationales, such as the inventor’s common sense, the predictability of the combination, were also appropriate). For a 
list of rationales, see the USPTO’s post-KSR Guidelines 2007 72 FR 195, 57526-57535 (updated in 2010). 
176 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, ___ (2007) 
177Ali Mojibi, An Empirical Study of the Effect of KSR V. Teleflex on the Federal Circuit’s Patent Validity 
Jurisprudence (2010). Albany Law Journal of Science and Technology, Vol. 20, No. 3, p. 101, 2010. (concluding 
that after KSR, the courts are more likely to find patents obvious based on a <can you check the study, add the 
actual numbers from the study.) 
178 Jennifer Phend Nock and Sreekar Gadde, Raising the Bar for Nonobviousness: An Empirical Study of Federal 
Circuit Case Law Following KSR, available at _____ (look for published version), Abstract (“[I]n the two and half 
years after the decision, the Federal Circuit “did not reverse a single lower-tribunal determination [that a patent was 
obvious and thus invalid]. Nonobvious findings below, by contrast, were affirmed just 52.50% of the time.”) 
However, this has not meant the abandonment of the TSM test, at least based on early indications. Simic, Emer 
Louise, The TSM Test is Dead! Long Live the TSM Test! The Aftermath of KSR, What Was All the Fuss About?. 
AIPLA Quarterly Journal, Vol. 37, No. 2, p. 227, 2009, accord id. (finding that  
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distinguish obvious from nonobvious inventions. Courts must take into account a “constellation 
of factors” that can be proven based on various types of factual evidence regarding what a 
POSITA would have thought, and done.179 The inputs as well as the outcomes of this analysis are 
uncertain. Academics have questioned the PTO’s ability, within the time and resource constraints 
it faces, to apply these factors as intended.180 
 
As one industry insider put it, “because that determination of subjective factors requires 
so much research and time [] I don‘t really believe that any of us in the industry really pay a lot 
of attention to KSR.”181 Practitioners have echoed these themes, criticizing the decision as taking 
away “objectivity, instead supplanting it with a subjective test.”182 While this could change over 
time, if it becomes easier to agree upon what inventions fail the standard, these experiences 
confirm the difference between judicial and real-world success.  
 
3. Increasing Maintenance Fees  
 
Several have suggested reducing patent numbers by increasing what it costs to keep 
patents in force.183 Increasing maintenance fees was also proposed in the late 19th century, for 
largely the same reasons:184 it was argued that the grant of a patent “is a tax upon, or a 
deprivation to the public, and should not be perpetuated unless it is worth a good price.” 185 
Then, as now, patent speculators tended to amass “old patents” to assert them.186 By hiking fees, 
                                                 
179 Daralyn J. Durie and Mark A. Lemley, A Realistic Approach to the Obviousness of Inventions, 50 Wm. & Mary 
L. Rev. 989, 990 (2008). 
180 Daralyn J. Durie and Mark A. Lemley, A Realistic Approach to the Obviousness of Inventions, 50 Wm. & Mary 
L. Rev. 989, 1008-13(2008). 
181Duane Valz, supra note ___, at 237.  
182 http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/04/29/ksr-the-5th-anniversary-one-supremely-obvious-mess/id=24456/ 
183 See, e.g. Gerard Magliocca, Barnyards and Blackberries at 1813 and 1836-1837 (describing increased 
maintenance fees as a “dormancy tax”), Brian Love, Troll Timing, at ___. See also, Ted Sichelman, 
Commercializing Patents at 411 (proposing that the PTO could charge an order of magnitude greater than it 
currently does for a “commercialization patent.”) 
184 U.S. Senate, "Arguments before the Committees on Patents of the Senate and the House of Representatives in 
Support of and Suggesting Amendments to Bills (S. 300 and H.R. 16I2) to Amend the Statutes in Relation to 
Patents, and for Other Purposes," 45th Cong., 2d sess., miscellaneous document no. 50, 304 [hereinafter Arguments 
before the Committees] (Mr. Hyde), at 253 (G. H. Christy, of Pittsburgh, for car-brake manufacturers ) (“the result 
[of the renewal fees] will be undoubtedly to remedy a large portion of the evils which [J. H. Raymond] has set forth, 
such as speculations in patents, etc.”); Id. at 304 (Henry D. Hyde, of Boston, for the Shoe and Leather Association 
of Boston) (“We believe that is is a wise provision, for there are a great many patents which are taken out, and 
which lie dormant and are not put into active use.”). 
185 Id., at 233 (J. H. Raymond). 
186 Cf.  “I believe I should not be overstating the case if I were to say that I could go into the Patent Office and find 
old patents to-day which, may be bought for a song, that would enable me to bring at least a dozen well-founded 
suits against the Senator from Massachusetts himself. I suspect I could, and for a sixpence buy up some old patent 
that under his proposition would compel him either to pay me a royalty or to strip his boots off on Pennsylvania 
avenue. And I suspect that if I were to examine his suspenders I could find they infringe a half dozen patents, and 
that under his amendment he must take them off and run the risk of walking down the street without them, or else 
pay several royalties. I think I could obtain enough old patents to disrobe the Senator from Massachusetts entirely, 
or else compel him to pay a royalty for something that is actually worthless.” 270-271  Windom and Brian Love, 
Troll Timing supra note ___, at __. 
  26   
the thinking goes, fewer patents will survive long enough to end up with trolls.187 Several 
proposals would increase the amount and frequency of maintenance fees.188 There does seem to 
be some room to increase fees. Controlling for wealth, US patent fees are at an all-time low, 
“suggesting that the U.S. patent system has never been so affordable. Current fees would need to 
increase approximately tenfold to match their 1800 level.”189 Globally, pre- and post-grant fees 
per capita in the US are in the lowest 1/3 tier.190 
a. Broad-Sweeping Reform 
 
 However, changing maintenance fees represents broad-sweeping, rather than tailored 
reform. It impacts not only marginal software patents held by trolls, but all others as well – 
strong and weak non-software patents, held by startups and large companies, for various reasons. 
For example, consider a modest change to the existing system which requires payments to be 
made at 3.5, 7.5, and 11.5191 years that would make fees due every year and double them. This 
could severely impact small entities and entrepreneurs who are cash-strapped.192 Indeed, critics 
of the unsuccessful late 19th century fee reform proposals thought they were ten-fold too large 
and did not take into account the realities of inventors, who needed time to test their inventions 
before paying fees on them.193  
 
However, carving small entities out from any change in maintenance fees is likely to also 
avoid the desired policy result, as it is individuals and small companies that provide the bulk of 
patents to PAEs.194 According to data provided by RPX, which buys patents in the marketplace, 
over three-quarters of PAE/NPE patents come from small inventors and individuals.195 In 
addition, while a modest change is likely to hurt small entities the most, it is unlikely to make a 
difference to companies who may pay in the thousands or even millions for a patent, expecting 
much greater returns.196 Even if fewer patents end up available for sale, few trolls rely on having 
                                                 
187 It was argued in Congress in that the grant of a patent “is a tax upon, or a deprivation to the public, and should 
not be perpetuated unless it is worth a good price.”187   
188 See, e.g. Magliocca, Barnyards, supra note ___, at 1836-1837 (describing and calling such a proposal a 
“dormancy tax”).  Accord Love, supra note ___, at ___. Others have considered increasing the fee to obtain rather 
than maintain, a patent to, say, $50,000 per patent, see, e.g. Timothy K. Wilson, Patent Demand – A Simple Path to 
Patent Reform, 2 International In-house Counsel Journal 5, 806(Autumn 2008), at fn.8 available at 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/law/wilsonpatentfees.pdf 
189Gaetan de Rassenfosse and Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie,“The role of fees in patent systems: Theory 
and Evidence” Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia Working Paper No. 7/10 ISSN 1447-2317 
(November 2010), 6 
190 Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe, Table 1  
191 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(e)–(g) (2011). (update with 2012 numbers once PPAC is finished with their process) 
192 And indeed, there is some evidence that patentees are price-sensitive. See de Rassenfosse G. and B. van 
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, On the price elasticity of demand for patents, 74 OXFORD BULLETIN OF ECON. AND 
STATISTICS 58-77 (2011).   
193 See, e.g. comments of W.C. Dodge, representative of the Patent Office Bar Association, Arguments before the 
Committees, supra note ___, 69-80. 
194 Individual inventors and PAEs with few employees may also qualify for micro-entity status, entitling them to a 
75% discount off of large-entity fees. America Invents Act, Section 10(b). 
195 Colleen Chien, Race to the Bottom Intellectual Asset Management Magazine (January/February 2012), Figure 2. 
196 Accord, Mark Lemley, Fixing the Patent Office, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2023958. (“A maintenance fee of $40,000$50,000—ten times 
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huge portfolios of patents;197 the limiting factor for most trolls is not usually the number of 
patents, but the resources to assert them. 
 
These realities have likely made the proposed PTO fee increases more measured than 
they might otherwise be. Section 10 of the America Invents Act gives the PTO the authority to 
set fees, in order “to recover the aggregate estimated costs to the Office for processing, activities, 
services, and materials relating to patents.” Although it does not cost the PTO anything to 
maintain a patent, the PTO is “not required to align individual fees and activity costs on a fee-by-
fee basis.”198 In its 2012 proposal to reset fees, the PTO boosted large entity maintenance fees 
(first to third stages) by 42% (from $1,130 to $1,600), 26% (from $2,850 to $3,600) and 61% 
(from $4,730 to $7,600), respectively.199 The rationale for doing so was to rebalance front‐end 
and backend fees with policy objectives: “early stage fees are lower in recognition of the 
uncertainty of patent value; as time goes on, an inventor can better measure the value of an 
invention and determine whether maintenance is truly worthwhile.”200 In its presentation to the 
PTO’s advisory board, the Office explained that the suggested fee increase, among other things, 
was meant to nudge “the marginal patent into the public domain more quickly.” 201 These are 
welcome policy changes that, if enacted, should reduce, though not eliminate the lifetime and 
risk presented by marginal patents. 
 
4. Better Patent Examination 
 
 If the problem is that there are a lot of low-quality patents, one solution, oft-heard, would 
be for the PTO to more strictly apply patentability standards  They could do so by more 
stringently policing the disclosure requirements of 35 USC 112, using better prior art, and getting 
full access to the fees that they generate, for example.202  
 
a. Patent Legacies 
 
Here, the PTO’s recent experience with business methods203 may be instructive. In 2000, 
the PTO increased the resources dedicated to examination of business methods, in effect 
supporting a double review.204 The allowance rate of business method applications dropped 
                                                                                                                                                             
the current fee—may weed out more patents that aren’t being used, but it is unlikely to deter someone considering 
spending perhaps 100 times that much to litigate a patent.”) 
197 Chien, Arms Race, supra note ___ (citing studies by Risch and Henkel & Fischer that find troll patents to be 
higher quality and examples of trolls that have small, but high-quality portfolios and are more numerous than patent 
aggregator-asserters like Intellectual Ventures). 
198 Susan J. Irving, United States Government Accountability Office Report on the Patent and Trademark Office: 
New User Fee Design Presents Opportunities to Build on Transparency and Communication Success, p.2 (April 25, 
2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590382.pdf. 
199 USPTO Executive Summary: Patent fee Proposal Submitted to Patent Public Advisory Committee on February 
7, 2012, p. 11, available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/fee_setting_-
_ppac_hearing_executive_summary_7feb12.pdf. 
200 Id. 
201Id. at 18. 
202 These and other ways of “Fixing the Patent Office” are discussed in Mark Lemley’s article of the same title, 
supra note ___,  
203 Described supra at note ___. 
204 Described supra at note ___. 
  28   
dramatically, to around 10%.205 However effective this program was, however, however,  it had 
no impact on patents issued before 2000. As pointed out earlier, patent speculators past and 
present tend to use old patents.206  
 
Twelve years later, business method litigations have not subsided. Rather they have 
grown.207 (Figure 3)  This is not to say that the better examination doesn’t matter or that the 
number of litigations isn’t fewer than they would have been had there been no double review of 
business method patents. The point is simply that whatever the PTO does today will not impact 
the generation of “legacy patents,” examined under varying conditions and likely of different 
quality.208 
 
Figure 3: 
 
C. Proposals to Bolster Defenses and Decrease Remedies 
                                                 
205 Described supra at note ___.  
206 Described supra at note ___. 
207 The source of this data was Lex Machina, which uses [describe methodology?]. These results were then verified 
using PTO data. Class 705 was created in 1997 from the business and cost/price sections of computer classes 395 
and 364, see Gene Quinn, Business Methods by the Numbers: A Look Inside the PTO Class 705, IP Watchdog 
(January 12, 2012) http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/01/22/business-methods-by-the-numbers-a-look-inside-pto-
class-705/id=21892/. Class 705 is perceived to track business method patents so closely that Congress attempted to 
define “covered business-method patent” by using the definition of the PTO class.  See Matal, supra note ___, at 
116. 
208 Accord Christina Mulligan and Tim B. Lee, Scaling the Patent System, NYU Annual Survey of American Law, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2016968. (arguing that efforts to reform patent 
quality by themselves, won’t help), Mark Lemley, The Return of Functional Claiming, *34 available at _     , (noting 
that even weeding out 90% of patents will still leave a thicket in technology areas and that “smartphone companies, 
for instance, would likely take little solace in being told that they need only clear rights for 25,000 essential patents, 
not 250,000.”) 
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Several proposals have been developed that address the problem of specialized plaintiffs 
that are invulnerable to countersuit and seek high-stakes injunctions. 
 
1. An Independent Invention Defense  
 
A popular suggestion has been to create an independent invention defense to patent 
infringement.209 Right now, a company that has no knowledge of a patent, and did not learn of 
the invention from the patentee can still be sued for patent infringement and asked to stop.210 
Introducing an independent invention defense would change this, shielding so-called “innocent” 
infringement from liability.  Because copying is rarely asserted in patent infringement,211 it is 
believed that an independent defense would solve the problem of both holdup and trolls.212 It 
would also greatly diminish patent quality problems by preventing obvious inventions from 
becoming the patentee’s exclusive domain since others are likely to come up with it on their 
own.213 
 
Though it has not been the subject of a serious recent legislative proposal, an innocent 
user defense was proposed in the 1880s. The proposal was notably narrower than the defense of 
innocent infringement many are now calling for. It would shield innocent buyers of technology 
from claims of patent infringement; the patentee could still pursue the manufacturer.214  
 
a. Broad-Sweeping Change 
 
Still, the defense was viewed as undermining the entire patent system and the incentive to 
innovate, for the sake of a few.215 It would diminish US competitiveness,216 it was claimed, and 
                                                 
209 See, e.g., FTC Evolving Marketplace, supra note ___, at ___. 
210 See, Roger D. Blair and Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its Alternatives in Patent Law, 17 Berk.Tech. Law 
Journal, available at http://www.btlj.org/data/articles/17_02_05.pdf (exploring the “strict liability” nature of patent 
infringement). 
211 Christopher A. Cotropia and Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1425 (2009). 
212 See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Aligning Reward and Contribution. NBER Working Paper No. 13141. May 2007, 131 
(claiming it would “in one fell swoop, do away with many of the problems with a patent holdup”); Mark A. Lemley, 
Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1525, 1525 (2007) (the defense “would 
eliminate the troll problem”). 
213 Id. Shapiro at 131. 
214 “As I understand the amendment now under consideration, it proposes to leave to the inventor all his remedies 
against the man who manufactures without his consent a patented, article, [] but it seeks to protect only those who, 
without knowing of the existence of his patent or that the article manufactured or sold trenches upon his patented 
rights in good faith buy an article from the manufacturer or seller for their own use. It protects such purchasers 
against a suit for damages.” 270. <need complete cite> 
215 ““[T]he amendment proposed by my friend, the Senator from Minnesota (Sen. Windom), would completely 
abolish the patent laws. []” “Now, the Senator from Minnesota proposes an amendment which strikes down the 
patent law of this country substantially. There is nothing of it worth having left when the amendment of the Senator 
from Minnesota shall be adopted, if it shall be.” 269; “There are hard cases, there are cases of extreme hardship, I 
am fully aware, under the administration of the existing law; the Senator from Minnesota has alluded to some of 
them; but that hardship is hardly a sufficient justification, in my judgment, for abolishing that system of patents 
which has accomplished so much in this country.” 272 (Hamlin). <need complete cite> 
216 “It is, in the nature of things, impossible; and this is simply, in my judgment, an amendment which would 
entirely prostrate the patent system to which the country owes so much, and through which this country is enabled to 
contest with foreign countries in the markets of the world.” 8 Cong. Rec 269 (1879). <who said this?> 
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might also disproportionately benefit large corporations,217 who by the virtue of their sales, 
arguably had the most to gain from the defense.  
 
Modern commentators have echoed these reservations. The most important inventions 
could be delayed or not disclosed.218 Commercialization incentives may also be dampened, as 
patentholders would be unable to depend on any assurance of exclusivity.219 The impact of the 
cure could potentially be much worse than the disease.220 Many of the details have not been 
thought through – where the burden would lie, what kind of proof would be required, the 
transferability of the defense, and the differential impact on industries and particular types of 
patentholders and defendants.221  
 
An independent invention may not even be available all or perhaps most of the time – 
although copying is not often alleged in the courtroom, companies copy each other all the 
time.222 Said one boss allegedly, at a social gaming company “I don’t fucking want innovation. 
Just copy what they do and do it until you get their numbers.”223 In addition, as Mark Lemley has 
pointed out, “copying” a patent that is claimed in functional language can amount to just taking 
the idea from another’s product or description, rather than the specific embodiment of the idea.224 
While spreading ideas accelerates innovation, such copying would not qualify for the defense. 
Can a company that learns of an idea from a third party who copied it from the patentee claim 
independent invention? There is no clear answer. These levels of uncertainty have likely 
prevented any serious proposals to create an independent invention defense to date.225  
 
b. Towards An Innocent User Defense to Software Patent Infringement?226 
 
                                                 
217 See Sen Hoar’s Proposal to amend Sen. Windom’s Proposal, Supra, note ___. “Without [amending the proposal] 
any railroad corporation or wealthy manufacturer, having got possession of the invention without notice of the 
Patent, may continue to use it in spite of the most plain and emphatic notice.” 8 CG 269. 
218 See, e.g., Samson Vermont, The Angel Is in the Big Picture: A Response to Lemley, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1537 
(2007) (summarizing and agreeing with the reservation of Mark Lemley to an independent invention defense that it 
could slow down important innovations). See also, Carl Shapiro, supra note ___, at 130-1 (acknowledging that such 
a defense could drive some inventors to trade secrets rather than patents, and create uncertainty for patentees). 
219 Lemley, supra note ___ Proof of Copying, at 1529-30(describing this potential impact of the defense on the drug 
industry). 
220 See, e.g., Vermont, supra note ___ , Angel at 1538 (characterizing the unknown impact of a reinvention defense 
as akin to “playing with fire”). 
221 Some of these are described, e.g., in Shapiro, supra note ___ at 133-135. 
222 Described, e.g., Pretty Profitable Parrots, For businesses, being good at copying is a least as important as being 
innovative, The Economist Blog (May 12, 2012) available at  http://www.economist.com/node/21554500 (extolling 
the virtues and prevalence of copying). The allegation that copying is widespread is not necessarily inconsistent with 
the findings of Christopher Cotropia & Mark Lemley, in Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421 (2009) that 
willfulness is alleged in few patent litigations. For example, one company may copy another’s feature without any 
awareness of the specific patents that cover the feature, or the feature may not be patented. The copying may go 
undetected, especially if it’s a method invention.  
223 Id. The Economist Blog; see also Oded Shenkar, COPYCATS: HOW SMART COMPANIES USE IMITATION TO GAIN A 
STRATEGIC EDGE, Harvard Business Press 2010 (add parenthetical) 
224 Lemley, Functional Claiming, at 35. 
225 FTC Evolving Marketplace 2011, supra note ___, at 17 (“a substantial change along these lines could result in a 
dramatically different patent system, and knowledge in this area is limited.”). 
226 See, e.g., Colleen Chien, working project of the same title, in preparation for November 16, 2012 Conference: 
Solutions to the Software Patent Problem.  
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A defense that could accomplish many of the aims of an independent invention defense 
and avoid many of its problems is an innocent user defense for software patents. Patentholders 
don’t usually sue consumers – it risks alienating potential customers and it is expensive to go 
after them one by one. But PAEs don’t have customers and, when they use a nuisance fee model, 
can potentially make more money by going after several individual users rather than a single 
manufacturer. 
 
But a consumer defense could immunize users like the Red Cross that use off the shelf 
technology to solicit donations, small companies that buy PDF machines, and coffee shops that 
offer wifi. These types of defendants are not in the business of patents and devising new 
technology, their liability arises from using technology and having revenue. 
 
While radical-sounding, an innocent consumer defense is well-precedented. Germany, 
France, the UK, Japan, and Canada also feature a non-commercial user defense.227 The United 
States also has features a limited user defense: medical doctors using patented surgical methods 
have a statutory shield from claims of patent infringement through 35 USC Section 287(c).  
 
A version of an innocent consumer defense could be accomplished in a number of ways. 
The legislature could enact such a defense. However, parties could bring, and judges could 
favorably rule, on requests to stay cases brought against individual users if a case with the 
manufacturer is pending or filed, akin to the Section 18 of the AIA. Parties and courts could also 
make and support requests to implead manufacturers as necessary parties to such actions and 
suspending users from suits in the meanwhile. 
 
2. Injunctions Reform at the ITC 
 
 eBay made it harder for NPEs to get injunctions, reducing much of the leverage district 
court patentees used to wield by virtue of the possibility of shutting down the defendant’s 
product. But this result can be circumvented by filing qualifying patent cases at the International 
Trade Commission (ITC), where injunctions remain readily available. One suggestion has been 
to close this “loophole” by making the injunction standard consistent across the ITC and district 
courts.  
 
There are a variety of ways that this could be accomplished. Congress could simply 
require the ITC to follow eBay, rather than its current standard. Or the ITC could implement the 
existing public interest analysis it is required to carry out to reach results that are similar to the 
district court applying eBay. It could make greater use of the flexibility it has to award exclusion 
orders, in a way that reduces the undue bargaining power associated with an injunction.228 The 
ITC domestic industry requirement could be interpreted to exclude from the ITC altogether the 
                                                 
227 Like the defenses available under Chinese patent law, as described, e.g., in Betty Sun,  
 International Harmonization: A Focus on China, the United States, and the Patent Law (May 2012) (unpublished 
paper on file with the author) (describing the innocent user defense and non-commercial user exemption from 
infringement). 
228 These ideas are described in Chien and Lemley, supra note ___.  
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cases that are the least likely to deserve them under eBay.229 A variety of ITC reform efforts are 
being considered that implement these strategies.230 
 
D. Proposals to Reduce the Incentive to Bring Nuisance Suits 
1. Increased use of Fee-Shifting/Sanctions in Patent Cases 
 
Fee-shifting has been proposed as one way to deter patent suits that are brought for their 
nuisance value.231 “Nuisance suits” have a low expected recovery value - because the patent is 
weak or its economic value is low.232 While the low value of the suit would normally deter it - it 
doesn't make sense to pay $10 to recover $5 - nuisance suit economics dictate otherwise, because 
the high cost of defense increases the likelihood of a favorable settlement.233 (Figure 2) Fee-
shifting changes the economics by requiring an unsuccessful plaintiff to foot the defendant’s 
legal fees, punishing and deterring low-probability claims.  
Figure 2: Patent Nuisance Fee Economics234 
 
                                                 
229 See, e.g., Chien, Patently Protectionist, supra note___, at 106-107. Colleen Chien, Protecting Domestic 
Industries, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 169,___ .(2011)  
230 Described, e.g., in Chien and Lemley, supra note ___. 
231 See Solveig Singleton, Patents and Loser Pays: Why Not?, Profress & Freedom Foundation Progress on Point 
Paper Np. 13.3, available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=980346,  See also HR ___ Reps. 
DeFazio and Chaffetz Bill 112th Congress (2012) (the SHIELD Act), described infra at note ___ (proposing one-
way fee shifting to losing patentees in software patent cases where the “patentee did not have a reasonable 
likelihood of succeeding.”). See also Remarks of Rep. Mel Watt and Others, July 18, 2012 Subcommittee Hearing 
on the International Trade Commission and Patent Remedies (discussing the viability of a related judicial tool – 
sanctions –at the ITC to deter litigation abuses); Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109thCong. at Section 5 
(2006) (proposing mandatory fee shifting in patent cases), described infra at note ___, available at 
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232 For example, because it covers a component that can be easily substituted. 
233 See, e.g., David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 
Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 3 (1985).  
234 Adopted from Id., at 3-4. 
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Nearly as long as there have been nuisance lawsuits, there have been efforts to deter 
them.235 Fee-shifting statutes can be mandatory or discretionary, one-way or two-way.236 In 
Europe, the losing party pays the winning parties’ expenses and fees under the so-called “English 
Rule,”237 a two-way mandatory shift. In order to increase access to justice,238 the US has enacted 
fee-shifting rules that favor plaintiffs in public interest and civil rights contexts.239 Alaska has 
adopted the English rule generally,240 and a handful of other states have some version of 
mandatory fee-shifting in narrow contexts.241 But they are the exception rather than the rule.  In 
the US, courts generally must determine independently of the merits of the overall case whether 
one party has behaved badly enough to be punished.242 Since 1937, for example, Rule 11 has 
authorized federal judges to sanction attorneys if they fail to vet a pleading before filing it.243  
a. Does Fee-Shifting Deter Frivolous Litigation? Theory And Evidence  
 Fee-shifting rules have long been in place, but have they worked to deter frivolous 
litigation?244 The theoretical and empirical literature on fee-shifting has been described as 
                                                 
235 Pfenningstorf, supra note ___ at p. 41-42. (describing how, by the time of Justinian, "a practice developed to 
require the losing party to reimburse the winner for his costs in cases of frivolous litigation and in cases of bad faith 
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Justinian, "the ecclesiastical courts of the Roman Catholic Church eventually by the courts of the emerging 
European nations."). 
236 See, e.g., Thomas Rowe, Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.  Winter  
1984, 140-1(describing these and other variables among fee-shifting rules including exceptions to the rule and  the 
method of calculation for fees to be shifted). 
237 This term is a misnomer as fee-shifting is the rule in most Western jurisdictions, not just England. Pfenningstorf, 
supra note ___ at p.41-2 and 44 et seq (describing the “European rule” which, in among many instantiations, 
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value of fee-shifting statutes however other rationales include fairness and making those wronged whole. See Rowe, 
The Legal Theoy of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 653 and Pfenningstorf, supra 
note ___ at 66-68. 
239 See e.g., The Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fees Awards Act Section 1988, described in Thomas D. Rowe Jr. and 
David A. Anderson, One-Way Fee Shifting Statutes and Offer of Judgment Rules: An Experiment, 36 Jurimetrics 
Journal (1996). 
240 See Alaska R. Civ. P. 82. 
241 See Thomas Rowe, supra note ___fn. 8 (describing rules in Arizona, California, Florida and Illinois). 
242 See, e.g., Thomas Rowe, supra note ___at 141 (commenting that in general, two-way fee shifting is unlikely to 
ever be adopted widely in the US). 
243 FRCP Rule 11 (1992). See also Gerald F. Hess, Rule 11 Practice in Federal and State Court: An Empirical, 
Comparative Study, 75 Marquette Law Review 313, ___ (1992). Following regional circuit precedent, the Federal 
Circuit has held that “before a district court awards Rule 11 sanctions under Ninth Circuit law, the district court 
must determine that the complaint is “legally or factually ‘baseless’ from an objective perspective” and that the 
attorney failed to conduct a “reasonable and competent inquiry” before filing the complaint.” Eon-Net LP v. 
Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F. 3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 
2002)). 
244 Excluding one-way plaintiff favorable statutes, and those passed for other reasons, including those described 
supra at note ___. 
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“vast”245 and “immense,”246 the latter encompassing simulations, surveys, and theoretical 
models.247 However, only a select few of them focus on the specific question of whether fee-
shifting statutes that intend to deter frivolous litigation (rather than to make it cheaper to bring 
meritorious suits, for example) actually do so. Below I summarize the relevant theory and 
evidence. Though my summary, like the literature, tends to focus on mandatory fee-shifting, 
much of the reasoning extends, albeit with less force, to discretionary regimes as well.  
Weak cases are cases that are likely to lose at trial. As Shavell and Rosenberg have 
explained, a mandatory fee-shifting regime punishes plaintiffs who bring such cases when they 
do in fact lose.248 According to theory, the regime makes defendants more willing to fight than 
fold, because the fees they incur will be repaid. Plaintiffs will also be discouraged from bringing 
weak cases due to the penalty they will have to pay when they lose.   
Yet theorists have pointed out various limitations of the rule. The dynamics described 
work best when the penalties cannot be avoided, by the plaintiff going bankrupt for example, and 
when weak cases can be identified ahead of time.249 But these predicates are not always present. 
Theoretical work by Polinsky and Rubinfield concluded that the English Rule may encourage 
plaintiffs who bring cases the basis of weaker claims to go to trial because they know that the 
risks associated with erroneous outcome will increase the penalty to the defendant.250 Even if 
fee-shifting rules deter frivolous claims, they will also deter meritorious claims.251 According to 
critics, the “real losers” are those with credible, but uncertain cases who cannot bear the risk of 
paying the opposing party’s costs if, despite the strength of the case, they nonetheless lose in 
court.252   
Theory and common sense also imply that mandatory fee-shifting has differential impacts 
upon different types of plaintiffs and cases. Two-way fee-shifting discourages pessimistic 
plaintiffs, who are afraid of having to pay their opponents’ fees but encourages optimistic 
plaintiffs, who think they will win, “all expenses paid,”253 so to speak, and also impacts 
conservative and risk-taking defendants differently. The decision-making of “one-shotters,” 
rather than repeat plaintiffs, and in low-value, as opposed to high value cases, is more likely to 
be influenced by the specter of fee-shifting.254 More plainly: the possibility of having to pay over 
                                                 
245 Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller’s terrific paper, The English vs. The American Rule on Attorneys Fees: 
An Empirical Study of Attorney Fee Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts, supra note ___ at ___.  
246 See e.g., John J. Donohue, Opting for the British Rule: or, If Posner and Shavell Can’t Remember the Coase 
Theorem, Who Will?, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1093 (1991). 
247 Described, e.g., in Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller supra note ___at 14-16. 
248 David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 Int'l Rev. 
L. & Econ. 3 (1985).  
249 Id. at 9. 
250 There is some empirical support for this theoretical finding. According to Rhode, a fee-shifting rule for medical 
malpractice cases in Florida may have decreased the number of cases which were filed, but the number going to trial 
actually increased. Plaintiffs fought harder in litigation because the stakes were higher.  See Deborah L. Rhode, 
Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the Problem, Recasting the solution, 54 Duke Law 
Journal 447, 474-475 (2004). 
251 Id. 
252 Id. 
253 Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller supra note ___ at 12. 
254 Thomas Rowe, Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter  1984, 
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$1M in attorney’s fees is more likely to influence a single inventor’s decision to assert her patent 
against a defendant hoping for a $100,000 judgment than a serial patent assertion entity like NTP 
that has recouped over $612M in a single case.255 
Turning to the empirical evidence, studies of mandatory two-way fee shifting cannot be 
characterized as uniformly encouraging. While proponents of the 'English Rule' credit it with the 
perceived relatively lower levels of litigation in Europe as compared to the US,256 several things 
undercut a direct inference. A comprehensive study of European fee-shifting statutes basically 
concluded that the task of assessing whether it worked was impossible.257 It's difficult to identify 
frivolous suits and to control and isolate the impact of the rule as opposed to other differences, 
for example.258 European laws don’t necessarily have the deterrent goal in mind. 259 
 In the United States, Alaska is the only state that has a more or less mandatory version of 
fee-shifting. Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82 states: “except as otherwise provided by law or 
agreed to by the parties, the prevailing party in a civil case shall be awarded attorney's fees 
calculated under this rule,”260 (emphasis added) and specifies a schedule for the recovery of 
fees.261 Two independent studies, one by by Douglas Rennie of 1997-2010 case filings in Alaska 
and comparable jurisdictions,262 and the other commissioned by Alaska’s Judicial Council263 
failed to find that the fee-shifting policy in Alaska has played a significant role in decreasing 
filings.264  
In a study published in 1992, Gerald Hess, surveying judges and attorneys in 
Washington, found that most believed that FRCP Rule 11 caused attorneys to increase their pre-
filing inquiries,265 however when asked about the Rule’s impact on filings, 50% of federal judges 
and 62% of federal attorneys believed that the Rule had none.266  
Section 505 shifts fees in copyright cases, stating that the “court in its discretion may 
allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the United States or an officer 
thereof. [][T]he court may also award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of 
                                                 
255 http://money.cnn.com/2006/03/03/technology/rimm_ntp/ 
256 Pfenningstorf, supra note ___ at 76. See also Rhode, at 456-7 (referencing studies that “debunk” claims that US 
per capita litigation is in fact greater than in other countries but also acknowledging that US tort awards and 
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257 Pfenningstorf, supra note ___ at 76 (describing the task as being of “gigantic dimensions and mind-boggling 
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258 Id. at 75-76. 
259 Id. at 75-76. 
260 Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82(a). 
261 Id. 
262 See generally Douglas C. Rennie, Rule 82 & Tort Reform: An Empirical Study of the Impact of Alaska’s English 
Rule on Federal Civil Case Filings, 29 Alaska Law Review 1 (2012). 
263 Susanne Di Pietro, et al., Alaska’s English Rule: Attorney’s Fee Shifting in Civil Cases (1995), available at 
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/reports/atyfeeexec.pdf 
264 Rennie supre note ___ at  43.; Pietro supra note ___ at ES-11. 
265 Hess supra note ___ at 327-328 (71% of federal court attorneys believed that Rule 11 caused their pre-filing fact 
inquires to increase, 63% believed that the rule caused their pre-filing legal inquiries to increase). 
266 Id. at 328-329. In 1993, Rule 11 was watered down significantly by the Federal Rules Advisory Committee, 
further diluting any impact. See, e.g. http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Schwartz03112011.pdf, at  
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the costs.”267 This standard is more permissive than Rule 11’s “legally or factually baseless” 
standard.268 Implementing Section 505,269 prevailing plaintiffs have gotten 89 percent of their fee 
award requests reimbursed,270 and prevailing defendants 61 percent,271 generally based on the 
“objective unreasonableness” of the claim.272  
 
Attorney fee judgments have been credited with contributing to the demise of copyright 
troll273 Righthaven.274 However, strong fee-shifting laws did not deter prevent the development 
of the copyright troll business model,275 and because of the particular facts of the case,276 the 
deterrent effect of copyright fee-shifting statutes on this business model are hard to know. Others 
believe Section 505 to be limited in its impact due to the divergence in how courts have 
interpreted it.277 Prevailing plaintiffs still seem to be favored.278   
 
Thus, fee-shifting statutes seem to make a difference, but the particulars vary, and even 
with respect to specific statutes, the impact is hard to measure with any sort of precision.  
b.Shifting Fees in Patent Cases 
                                                 
267 17 U.S.C. § 505.*4-*5 (describing the “weakening of the Rule 11” through this development) 
268 Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F. 3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 
1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
269 Though courts have historically favored prevailing plaintiffs, the Supreme Court held in Fogarty v. Fantasy, Inc. 
510 U.S. 517, 534-535 (1994) that §505 must be implemented in a manner which is party-neutral and “faithful to the 
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Case Against Copyright Trolls <fill cite> 
274 Jeffrey D. Neuburger, Copyright Infringement Defendats Turn the Table on Righthaven, PBS Mediashift 
(December 1, 2011) http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2011/12/copyright-infringement-defendants-turn-the-table-on-
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275 I am thankful to Eric Goldman for pointing this out to me. 
276 Steve Green, Righthaven: The Controversy Over Copyrights, Vegas Inc. (July 25, 2011) 
http://www.vegasinc.com/news/2011/jul/25/copyright-conundrum/ (describing Righthaven’s tactics of failing to get 
complete control of the copyrights, disclose its continuing interest in the outcome of its suits, leading to accusations 
of barratry and champerty, which presumably could be avoided by subsequent plaintiffs). 
277 Id. at 472-473. 
278 Barnes, supra note ___, at 1404 (describing how plaintiffs are likely to get their fees as a matter of course, but 
defendants are only likely to get their fees when the plaintiff brings the case in bad faith or are the claims are 
otherwise objectively unreasonable). Accord, Hyde & Sharrock, supra note ___, at 474-475. See also, e.g., Playboy 
Enters. v. San Filippo, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1350, 1356 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (“Generally, the plaintiff in a copyright action is 
awarded fees by virtue of prevailing in the action.”); Fantasy, Inc. v. La Face Records, No. C96-4384 SC ENE, 
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16359, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 1997) (“[C]ourts should bear in mind that awards of 
attorney's fees to prevailing defendants should be granted more sparingly than those awarded to prevailing plaintiffs, 
so that plaintiffs are not chilled in exercising their rights under the Copyright Act.”); Walden Music, Inc. v. C.H.W., 
Inc., No. 95-4023-SAC, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6622, at **18-19 (D. Kan. Apr. 19, 1996) (“The primary purpose of 
an attorney's fees award [under § 505] is ‘to serve as an economic incentive for a copyright holder to use the courts 
in challenging an infringement.”’); Belmore v. City Pages, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 673, 680-81 (D. Minn. 1996) 
(declining to award attorney's fees to the prevailing defendant because the defendant did not prove that the action 
was “frivolous or was commenced in bad faith”). 
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In patent cases, judges may already award attorney's fees in patent cases when the 
circumstances are “exceptional” (35 USC 285),279 and in other situations.280 Attorneys fees are 
awarded infrequently: from 2005-2011, there were on average 50 awards per year;281 in 
comparison to around 3,000 patent case filings on average per year.282 The majority of the 
attorney fee awards are made in cases that go to trial.283 The rule doesn’t favor either side, and 
slightly less than half of the awards are to prevailing defendants.284  
One way defendant favorable fee-shifting in patent cases has been proposed285 as a way 
to counter nuisance patent suits generally and more specifically, the dramatic increase in troll 
litigation.286 In the historical era, an agrarian patent reform proposal would have shifted fees in 
favor of the defendant in low-value suits, even where the plaintiff prevailed: “[i]f the plaintiff 
shall not recover the sum of $20 or over, the court shall adjudge him to pay his own costs, unless 
[infringement was knowing].”287 Similarly, a recent proposal would shift fees when the cost of 
the offense is greater than provable damages, to encourage settlement and discourage nuisance 
litigation.288 These types of proposal are analogous to “offer of judgment” rules such as Rule 
                                                 
279 35 USC 285: “The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” 
280 See, e.g., Vinson & Elkins LLP Presentation “Attorneys’ Fees Awards in Patent Litigation” (August 9, 2010) 
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285 See e.g., by Scott Kieff, The Case for Preferring Patent-Validity Litigation Over Second-Window And Gold-
Plated Patents: When One Size Doesn’t fit All, How Could Two Do the Trick?, 157 UPenn Law Rev. 1937 (2009), at 
1951 (proposing that prevailing defendants would get fees if the patentee had been warned about the particular prior 
art that ultimately invalidates the patent in court). 
286 Colleen Chien, NPEs and the ND California, Address at the Northern District of California Judicial Conference 9 
(April 26, 2012) (reporting data provided by RPX Corp. that indicates that 55% of new suits from January 1, 2012 to 
April 8, 2012 have been brought by NPEs) (copy on file with the author) (“NPE” suits exclude university and 
individual inventor suits). 
287 8 Cong. Rec. 652, 660 (1879). Described e.g., in Thomas D. Rowe Jr. and David A. Anderson, One-Way Fee 
Shifting Statutes and Offer of Judgment Rules: An Experiment, supra note ___ at __. 
288 Cite to FCAC proposal when released. 
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68289  that penalize plaintiffs who reject settlement offers greater than the value of the court-
determined judgment.290   
Other reform proposals have aligned the reward of fees more closely with actual defeat in 
the courtroom.  In 2006, a precursor bill to the America Invents Act would have placed a heavy 
thumb on the scale in favor of awarding attorney’s fees to prevailing parties, “unless the court 
finds that the position of the non-prevailing party or parties was substantially justified or that 
special circumstances make an award unjust.”291 In 2011, Judge Rader appeared to urge use of 
fee-shifting authority in nuisance fee cases, “when the case is over and the court can identify a 
troll or a grasshopper, I strongly advocate full-scale reversal of attorney fees and costs!”292  
The 2012 SHIELD Act features a one-way shift in favor defendants: 
“[I]n an action disputing the validity or alleging the infringement of a computer hardware 
or software patent, upon making a determination that the party alleging the infringement 
of the patent did not have a reasonable likelihood of succeeding, the court may award the 
recovery of full costs to the prevailing party, including reasonable attorney's fees, other 
than the United States.” 293 
Though this particular bill does not change the discretionary nature of Section 285, it 
does change the standard for awards and limits this change to high-tech patent cases when 
plaintiffs lose. On its face, there is much to like about the Act – it is narrowly tailored, purporting 
to apply only to cases involving high-tech cases, as NPE cases overwhelmingly are.294 It applies 
only ones where cases are brought despite the weakness of the patent. Though the reforms would 
extend beyond troll plaintiffs, it is hard to argue that fees should not be paid in such 
circumstances. 
c. The Differential Impact of Fee-Shifting on Different Patent Trolls and Tactics 
 As noted earlier, some commentators believe one-off plaintiffs are more sensitive to fee-
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290 For a description of the empirical data on offer of judgment rules, see Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller’s 
supra note ___ at 15-16. 
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shifting, and repeat players, less sensitive to fee-shifting.295 However, trolls suits are 
overwhelmingly brought by serial NPEs and professional licensing entities, according to data 
from RPX. Inventor suits, which are the types that are most likely to fit into the “one-off” 
category comprise only 18% of suits and 12% of NPE defendants.296  
 On the other hand, fee-shifting is likely to change the willingness of both patentees and 
lawyers to enter into contingent-fee representation. Because it reduces out-of-pocket costs for the 
plaintiff, contingent fee representation of patent plaintiffs is popular.297 But fee-shifting raises the 
stakes in a way that may discourage contingent-fee funded patent suits. In the absence of fee-
shifting, a contingent fee lawyer has little to lose from bringing a patent case, except his time. 
But regulations that would shift fees to the lawyer upon loss mean that if the contingent fee 
lawyer loses, he’ll lose much more than his time. The impact of statutes that shift fees to parties 
is similar. Parties use contingent fee representation to protect themselves from the risk of loss of 
legal fees with no upside if they lose. But under a fee-shifting regime, they are exposed to the 
risk of not only losing but paying the other side’s fees. Because of the indeterminacy of patent 
law, contingency economics are likely going to be impacted, even when the cases brought appear 
to be strong.298  
d. The Definitional Challenge- Identifying Patent Nuisance Suits 
 For a fee-shifting rule to deter frivolous litigation requires there to be a consistent 
understanding of when litigation is frivolous. In Eon-Net case, the Federal Circuit cited a variety 
of tactics to support its confirmation that the plaintiff’s case was objectively baseless.299 Judge 
Davis has also warned that suits where the theory of recovery is based on the “cost of defense” 
deserve to be sanctioned. 300 
However, it’s often hard to determine when fee-shifting warranted under a discretionary 
standard.  In his study of fee-shifting statutes throughout European, Werner Pfenningstorf 
observed that when costs are imposed only in the case of bad faith, rather than automatically, 
courts are reluctant to find make the requisite finding and rarely order the payment of fees.301 
This finding that is consistent with the infrequent use of the exceptional cases rule of 35 USC 
Section 285.302 Concerns about whether fee-shifting is over or under-deterring cases has also 
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plagued Rule 11, causing it to be significantly watered down in the early1990s.303 
Dividing cases into ones that “did not have a reasonable likelihood of succeeding” and 
those that did as is required by the SHIELD Act would likely also prove difficult. Although 
studies suggest that trolls overwhelmingly lose at trial,304 the indeterminacy of patent law305 
makes it hard to determine ex ante which cases are not going to be successful and which are. 
Some cases that could fall into the category include situation where the invalidating prior art is 
known before trial,306 the patent has been invalidated in another forum like the International 
Trade Commission307 or abroad, or the patentee has committed inequitable conduct. But such 
instances are few and far between, and would exclude many troll cases. 
Frivolousness, reasonableness, and exceptional-ness are in the eye of the beholder.308 
e. Scope 
In addition, fee-shifting does not punish tactics and abuses outside of the courtroom 
where the majority of assertions take place. Rather, fee-shifting generally only takes place only 
after a case has been decided or at least filed. The ratio between demands and lawsuits can be 
large. According to one account, troll E-Data sued 43 companies but offered licenses to at least 
25,000 others.309  
Based on talking to lawyers who assert other forms of IP, Bill Gallagher has concluded 
that “legal sanctions aimed at deterring over-reaching IP enforcement are unlikely to be effective 
because most such over-reaching occurs in informal disputing processes outside of the legal 
system.”310 The fees companies spend analyzing and worrying about cease and desist letters and 
negotiating with patentholders cannot be recouped through fee-shifting provisions that apply to 
litigation expenses. 
f. Circumvention and Avoidance 
Perhaps the most damning critique of loser pays rules is that they potentially can be 
circumvented.  More sophisticated trolls bring suits using shell companies created for the 
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specific purpose of shielding their investors from liability and scrutiny.311 Structured correctly, 
the entity need not be connected to the corporation’s sponsors or its assets. Faced with a sanction 
or attorney’s fee award against it, the LLC could go bankrupt rather than paying the penalty. In 
Europe, for example, German patent troll IP Com is structured as a special purpose entity (SPE) 
designed to be “judgment proof” from fee awards against it.312 If fee-shifting awards and 
sanctions can be avoided in this way, they will be. Indeed, such concerns apparently have already 
provided an incentive for them to be set up in this way:313Acacia has established subsidiaries to 
handle its litigations so that “the original patent owners- and other partner companies- are 
shielded from risk” and Intellectual Ventures incorporates a different shell for each of its patent 
purchases.314  
i. Circumvention and the Misjoinder Rules 
Circumvention in cost-reduction regulation has been attempted in the application of the 
new misjoinder rules. Trolls like to sue multiple defendants at once, both because it is cheaper to 
sue once rather than file separate actions and also because it gives defendants less time to present 
their cases, especially in districts that do not increase the amount of time available by the number 
of defendants.315 The “misjoinder rules” of the 2011 America Invents Act limits who can be sued 
in a single patent infringement action, to parties who are engaged in the “same accused product 
or process.”316 
When it became clear that the AIA and the misjoinder provisions would be going into 
effect, non-practicing entities (NPEs) rushed to the courthouse, filing an all-time high number of 
cases against a record number of defendants.317 This seemed to provide an early positive 
indication that the new rule would matter, by making it harder for patentees to capture the 
economies of scale associated with suing a large of number of defendants at the same time.  
The early results are mixed, but encouraging. While NPE case filings are up,318 the 
number of average defendants per NPE suit is down, from five to two.319 Taking both of these 
trends into account by counting total NPE defendants indicates a downward trend thus far 
(Figure 4). According to data collected by RPX Corporation, the average number of NPE 
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defendants per week in high technology sectors prior to passage of the AIA was 67,320 and since 
then through the end of January 2012, was down to 37.321 There are early indications that trolls 
are concentrating their efforts on bigger fry.322  
However, the misjoinder provisions do not extend to the International Trade 
Commission, where patentees can also bring infringement actions.  As would be expected, there 
is no indication thus far that the same decline in number of defendants per suit experienced in the 
district court will be experienced there.323 
 The misjoinder rules require codefendants to be engaged in the “same accused product or 
process.”324 This makes it harder to bring cases against disparate clients that are developing or 
using different products. However, it does not preclude suits brought against a group of 
defendants all using the same product. For example, Innovatio, LLC has sued hotels and coffee 
shops for their use of wireless technology.325  
Whether through fee-shifting or other proposals, the possibly of circumvention must be 
given serious consideration. 
2. Decreasing the Costs of Litigation 
 
 The problem may in fact not be the idea that patentees should be compensated, but how 
such compensation is accomplished. It is estimated that only a small fraction of the loss 
associated with NPEs is returned to innovators and their shareholders.326 As has written about 
tort law, where nuisance suits have also been perceived as a problem, perhaps the problem is not 
excessive litigation but the systematic “undercompensation of victims and overcompensation of 
lawyers.”327 
 
a. Judicial Innovation 
  
 A host of proposals fall under the category of streamlining and reducing the high costs of 
patent litigation. Much of this is within the power of the judiciary, to, for example, order early 
mediation/alternative dispute resolution procedures, limit the number of claims and issues in a 
                                                 
320 2011 data, not including the two weeks prior to passage of the law, due to the anomalous rush to the courthouse 
described earlier. 
321 RPX Corporation Analyst Day Presentation at slide 24. But see id. at slide 25 (showing that when the weeks right 
before the AIA are taken into account, the smoothed trend is increasing, rather than decreasing). 
322 RPX Corporation Analyst Day Presentation at slide 26 (reporting data to support the headline “NPEs Focusing 
Efforts on Larger Companies”). 
323 See, e.g., Colleen Chien and Mark Lemley, Public Interest, Patents, and the ITC __ Cornell Law Rev.__, Figure 
1 (forthcoming 2012) (showing that the number of defendants per suit has decreased dramatically in the district 
court post-AIA, without any corresponding decrease in the ITC). 
324 America Invents Act, Sec. 19(d), 125 Stat. at 332–33 (New Section 299). 
325 Gregory Thomas, Innovatio’s Infringement Suit Rampage Expands to Corporate Hotels, Patent Examiner 
(September 30, 2011) http://patentexaminer.org/2011/09/innovatios-infringement-suit-rampage-expands-to-
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326 James E. Bessen, Jennifer Laurissa Ford and Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, 
Regulation, Vol. 34, No. 4, p. 26, Winter 2011-2012. 
327 Rhode, supra note ___, at 459. 
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case,328 and request early disclosure of the value of the case.329 Perhaps the best developed 
proposal is the model e-Discovery order promulgated by the Federal Bar Association’s Advisory 
Council and adopted by several districts in various forms.330  
 
 Although these proposals have the potential to sweep across cases, judges have the 
discretion to implement them as they see fit. Importantly, they are well-aligned with judicial 
incentives to enhance the efficient resolution of cases. As forum-shopping has been tightened up, 
they have the potential to reduce the cost of defense, and therefore the economic opportunity 
offered by nuisance litigation. (Figure 2)  
 
b. Market-Based Innovation 
  
 RPX Corporation aims to introduce efficiency to patent assertion by “providing a rational 
alternative to traditional litigation strategy for our clients, offering defensive buying, acquisition 
syndication, patent intelligence, and advisory services.”331 This value proposition has proven 
compelling to its 100+ members, who pay a subscription fee every year to access the market 
intelligence and services of the firm. 332 IPXI launched in 2012 and also has the objective of 
reducing legal intermediaries by offering companies the ability to buy patent rights on an 
exchange. By selling Unit Licensing Rights (ULR) contracts, the firm hopes to connect buyers 
and sellers of technology rights, avoiding the need for costly enforcement campaigns.333 Though 
it is still early, in May 2012 the exchange had 27 “offering” members.334 
 
E. Self-Help  
Yet another way to change the patent system is to change the behavior of patentees and 
                                                 
328 Comments of Judge Lucy Koh, that to subject a jury to decide the infringement of 16 patents, six trademarks, five 
"trade dress" claims, and an antitrust case, with 37 products accused of violations would amount to “cruel and 
unusual punishment” that patent juries are subject to. See Stephen Lawson, Judge Again Orders Apple, Samsung to 
Stremline Claims in iPad Patent Case, Computerworld (May 2, 2012) 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9226803/Judge_again_orders_Apple_Samsung_to_streamline_claims_in_i
Pad_patent_case. See also Federal Judicial Council model instructions for streamlining patent cases (forthcoming 
2012); see also Roger Cheng, Even Judges are Fedup With Patent Lawsuits, cNet News (June 8, 2012)   
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13579_3-57449607-37/even-judges-are-fed-up-with-patent-lawsuits/ (describing court-
ordered case winnowing by Judges Posner and Koh). 
329 Chief Judge Randall Rader, speech at Santa Clara University Law School 2011, ____. 
330 Since the initial disclosure, there have been four cases of note:  three in E.D. TX. and one in N.D. CA. A 
summary of those cases and discovery holdings are available at  http://discoverready.com/blog/model-order-
generates-buzz-in-district-courts/. In December 2011, Delaware updated its default standards in eDiscovery. 
 Recognizing the merits of the Federal Model Order, Delaware has chosen to emphasize cooperation between parties 
in its standards.  The default standard will only apply when parties fail in their efforts to find consensus.  A summary 
is available at http://discoverready.com/blog/delaware-provides-default-e-discovery-limits/. In Spring 2012, 
the E.D. TX has issued its own Model Order, implemented as an appendix to its own local rules, allowing greater 
flexibility.  See Matt Miller, Texas Court Builds on Judge Rader’s Model Order, Discovery Ready (March 13, 2012) 
http://discoverready.com/blog/texas-court-builds-on-judge-raders-model-order/. 
331 See RPX Corp.’s Homepage http://www.rpxcorp.com/. 
332 http://ir.rpxcorp.com/faq.cfm 
333 See IPXI’s Products Page http://www.ipxi.com/products/ulr. 
334 See IPXI Press Release “Intellectual Property Exchange International attracts Leading global Corporations, 
Universities, National Laboratories as New Members,” available at http://www.ipxi.com/media/newsreleases/IPXI-
Attracts-Leading-Global-Corporation-Universities-National-Lab. 
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the targets of patent demands, rather than changing the law.335 The “lever” of behavioral change 
is an often overlooked force within the patent system, but its impact has been profound.  In 
general, social norms matter tremendously to how the law is received and interpreted, 336 and the 
patent system is no different. 
1. Demonstration Effects 
For years, companies acquired patents defensively because they saw others doing so, as 
part of the patent arms race.337 Demonstration effects in the offensive use of patents have also 
been instrumental as innovations in patent assertion have been quickly copied.338 Though it was 
once “unforgiveable sin” and “anathema”339 for operating companies to sell patents, this taboo 
has been dismantled as prominent companies and critics of patent trolls have engaged in doing 
so.340 Likewise, competitors suing each other has apparently become more commonplace.341 
Each of these developments, it can be argued, though enabled by the law, was not spurred by it, 
but rather shifts in patterns of behavior within the patent systems.  
Twitter’s “innovator patent assignment”342 and the “defensive patent license”343 
introduced by Shultz and Urban represent recent efforts to stem the flow of patents to patent 
trolls by tweaking social norms.344 RPX Corporation provides a collective, market-based solution 
to patent problems by buying up threatening patents on behalf of groups of its members, at a 
fraction of the price.345 The Coalition for Patent Fairness lobbies for changes to patent law on 
behalf of companies in the financial services, technology, energy, and related industries.346 
Elsewhere I have suggested the creation of a defensive non-profit entity347 that could focus, for 
                                                 
335 See, e.g. Chien, Arms Race, supra note ___, generally and at Section V.A. Behavioral Levers in the Patent Arms 
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example, primarily on challenging patents.  
2. Farmer and Railroad Groups 
During the agrarian patent crisis, farmer groups, led primarily by various state and 
National Grange associations, called on the states and Congress to change the law.348 They tried 
to minimize the damage caused by particular patents,349 and through their publications, 
publicized information about suits and tactics350 and educated farmers who were generally knew 
little about patent law. Though their lobbying efforts resulted in many unsuccessful bills, it is 
likely that they sensitized the Courts and Congress to the problems patents created for farmers 
and eventually resulted in the changes. 
Railroad associations also mounted formidable and professional self-help efforts on 
behalf of their members. The Eastern and Western Railroad Associations (ERA and WRA) 
offered a variety of defensive patent services to their members including discounted patenting 
services, patent clearance, fighting particular patent threats, and lobbying. 351 The railroads paid 
fees, assessed in proportion to earnings for these services but also made other commitments – to 
share information and coordinate legal strategies – as a condition of their membership.352 
The associations counted among their members “nearly all companies” 353 and were so 
effective at enlisting them to document technical developments that they could “readily establish 
precedence and undermine broad claims pertaining to virtually every aspect of technology.”354 
This allowed them to challenge the validity of patents asserted against their members. Because 
they included most members of the industry, the associations were able to present a “united 
front” in their dealings with patent holders.355  
The associations compelled their members to behave in a way supportive of the 
collective, rather than just the private, good. To undermine the “divide and conquer” approach of 
patent speculators, the ERA set up sanctions against their own members if they “negotiated their 
own agreements with holders of disputed patents.”356 If they settled individually rather than 
collectively, the railroads risked losing their rights to the association’s defenses. 357 
The associations justified these actions on the basis that these deals support patent 
speculators and undermined the chance of success in courts. 358 As the ERA announced in its 
annual report, “to obtain the best results, the members of the Association must act as a unit [] it is 
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believed that this unity of action has been the true cause of our success heretofore.”359 The 
associations were viewed as so effective they were accused of violating antirust laws and being 
illegal.360  
Though it would likely to difficult to replicate the structure of the railroad associations,361 
certain of their successes do provide direct inspiration. The AIA provides a lot more ways to 
challenge patents.362 A broad-based non-profit organization like IEEE could consider facilitating 
the sharing and pooling of technical information that could be used to take advantage of them. 
CONCLUSION  
 The adage that there is nothing new under the sun363 applies with surprising force to 
modern day patent reform. Each reform that is now being proposed – to shift-fees to losing 
plaintiffs, to abolish software patents, and to introduce an independent invention defense, for 
example – has not only been proposed but tried before in some form. History suggests that 
change looks different in hindsight than it does prospectively – in the past, the “abolishment” of 
farm patents was accomplished by the ratcheting up of the obviousness standard, and the 
effective organization of railroad groups was key to curbing the power of railroad patent sharks, 
for example. These and other lessons from the past can help guide, redirect, and reassure current 
and future patent reform efforts. They suggest that rather than seek broad-based legislative 
change, patent reformers would be well-advised to focus on incremental court and market-based 
reforms. 
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